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EXTENDED AXIOMATIC FUNCTIONALISM: POSTULATES[*]
James Dickins (University of Salford, UK) 
 
 
Abstract. These postulates, comprising six axioms plus ensuing definitions, pro-
vide a formal account of the semiotic (including linguistic) theory of extended 
axiomatic functionalism. They are organised to be maximally comparable with 
Mulder and Hervey’s postulates for standard axiomatic functionalism. The axi-
oms are the primitive statements of the theory, introducing new theoretical 
propositions. The definitions introduce technical terms by linking them to no-
tions in the theory. 
Axiom A and ensuing definitions detail the functional principle, dominating both 
components of the theory: the system ontology and the signum ontology. The 
system ontology deals with the abstract semiotic entities in cenology (linguistics, 
phonology), logology (linguistics, lexology), and delology (denotational seman-
tics). The signum ontology provides a set-theoretically based account of the rela-
tionship between system-ontological entities and semiotic occurrences (utter-
ances). Axiom B and ensuing definitions treat almost all aspects of the system 
ontology, except para-ontotactics, Axiom C and ensuing definitions treat para-
ontotactics, and Axiom D and ensuing definitions detail the notion ‘sentence’ 
(the maximal unit covered by the theory). Axiom E and ensuing definitions prin-
cipally treat the allontic level, while Axiom F and ensuing definitions treat re-
maining aspects of the signum ontology. 
Figure 1 Extended axiomatic functionalism: semiotics and Figure 2 Extended 
axiomatic functionalism: linguistics (at the end of the postulates) represent visu-
ally the main entities and notions of the theory. 
 
 
The scope of extended axiomatic functionalism compared to that of standard 
axiomatic functionalism 
 
Extended axiomatic functionalism has its origins in early 1980s, when Michael Lamb be-
came increasingly dissatisfied with aspects of the linguistic descriptions engendered by the 
standard version of axiomatic functionalism (henceforth standard axiomatic functionalism) 
developed by Mulder and Hervey since the 1960s (e.g. Mulder 1968; Mulder and Hervey 
1972; Hervey 1979; Mulder and Hervey 1980; also Mulder 1989).  
Lamb’s initial concerns focused around Mulder and Hervey’s rejection of free allomor-
phy, i.e. phonological variance which is not conditioned by phonological or grammatical 
context. At its simplest free allomorphy is a case in which a single word can be pro-
nounced in two or more phonologically distinct ways. An example is English /aiðr/ (rhym-
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ing with ‘blither’) and /iRðr/ (rhyming with ‘breather’) as phonologically distinct pronun-
ciations of the word ‘either’. On the basis that relatively dissimilar forms having identical 
denotations should be regarded as synonyms, i.e. different signa, Mulder and Hervey 
(1972: 29–30) argue that similar forms having identical denotations should be also re-
garded as synonyms, i.e. different signa (for the distinction between sign and signum, see 
Mulder 1989, 437, Def. 2a2; Dickins, below, Def. 2a2). Thus, for Mulder and Hervey not 
only are /felOu/ and /blOuk/ different but synonymous signa, so are /aiðr/ and /iRðr/. In 
justification of this position, they say: 
 
As just an example of what difficulties we would let ourselves in for if we used formal SIMI-
LARITY (e.g. /aiðr/~/iRðr/) rather than formal IDENTITY as a criterion to distinguish between 
SYNONYMS and other types of free variants, we should like to say the following. If we cannot 
give a precise criterion for what is still similar and what is not, the whole procedure would 
remain an arbitrary one, and nothing would prevent us from regarding fellow and bloke as 
just free variants, but identical signs [signa], as they have the phonological feature /lOu/ in 
common (Mulder and Hervey 1972: 30–31). 
 
In response to this, Lamb argues: 
 
Hypothesize i:ðə/aiðə [/aiðr/~/iRðr/] are one sign [signum]. Similarity of expression makes 
this a reasonable hypothesis. Hypothesis unrefuted, so these are free allomorphs. Even gross 
variance like parallelepiped and veterinary can be handled in this way [according to Web-
ster’s New International Dictionary parallelepiped can be pronounced as [pærəlεlεpaɪpεd], 
[pærəlεlεpɪpεd], [pærəlεlεpəpεd], and [pærələlεpəpεd]; veterinary similarly has a large num-
ber of alternative pronunciations]. 
Mulder and Hervey’s counter-example is not analogous: to hypothesize fellow/bloke are one 
sign [signum] is procedurally bizarre in the first place given the lack of similarity of expres-
sion (intuition alone is good enough for this) [Actually, this is shorthand. Logically, the onus 
is always on demonstrating distinctive function – a minimum of two distinctive functions in 
the first place, to have a semiotic system at all, and then all additional distinctive functions as 
they prove necessary. In a lexicon one has as it were in pre-history hypothesized two signs 
[signa] with allomorphs from A–M and N–Z and proceeded from there. E.g. “cool” and 
“cold” might invite the hypothesis that they are one sign [signum], but this is refuted by “It’s 
cool, but not cold” – Footnote in original.] ... in any case the hypothesis [that fellow and 
bloke are one signum] would be refuted the moment someone said “I’m not a bloke. I may 
be a fellow, but I’m not a bloke”, which seems likely enough. So obviously one hypothesizes 
different grammatically distinctive function. The fact that the denotata can be the same is a 
matter of semantic realisation. They are parallel to homophones which have different phono-
logical distinctive function but are impressionistically similar in terms of phonetic realisa-
tion. [Obviously real-life denotational circumstances are as crude with relation to contents as 
real-life phonetic noises are with relation to expressions – Footnote in original.] 
To hypothesize /aiðr/~/iRðr/ are different signs [signa] is invalid, however, as it is irrefuta-
ble. Different distinctive function will never be attested but, if intuition is disregarded, it is 
always possible to argue that some day it might be. Disproving the existence of the extra sign 
[signum] would be as impossible as disproving the existence of unicorns. However, to hy-
pothesize the existence of even one unnecessary sign [signum] is disallowed by the canon of 
simplicity and the claim of synonymy for such cases is reduced ad absurdum by gross vari-
ance like that of parallelipiped and veterinary (Lamb [1983] 2009: 3). 
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Mulder and Hervey’s prohibition of free allomorphy is not theorematic. There is noth-
ing in the postulates of standard axiomatic functionalism which rules out free allomorphy 
in theory. Rather, Mulder and Hervey argue that if free allomorphy were allowed in prac-
tice, there would be no coherent means of controlling its application (a view contested by 
Lamb, as seen). However, standard axiomatic functionalism not only rules out such allo-
morphy (‘polymorphy’) – i.e. formal variance (of a specific kind) of a signum. It also rules 
out polysemy (allosemy) – i.e. semantic variance (of a specific kind) of a signum. This it 
does in an explicitly theoretical manner (as can be theorematically deduced from the postu-
lates in Mulder 1989: 435–457; Mulder and Hervey 1980; 203–211: see, especially Def. 
2a1, Def. 24, Def. 5, Def. 5a, Def. 6). Thus, for Mulder and Hervey, ‘hand’ in the sense 
‘prehensile part of the body’ is a different signum from ‘hand’ in the sense ‘pointer on a 
dial, indicator, or gauge, which is a different signum from ‘hand’ in the sense ‘labourer or 
manual worker’, and a fortiori a different signum from ‘hand’ in one of its verbal senses, 
e.g. ‘transmit or offer by the hand’, or ‘hand’ as part of a compound word such as ‘hand-
out’ = ‘clothing, food, money, etc. given to a needy person’, or in a phrasal verb such as 
‘hand in’ = ‘submit’, or in an idiom such as ‘hand in glove’ = ‘in close association’. By the 
early 1980s, Lamb had come to the view that Mulder and Hervey’s insistence on analysing 
all cases of the type ‘hand’ as different signa, rather than as polysemy (of various types) of 
a single signum was so contrary to common sense that it undermined the acceptability of 
the theory of standard axiomatic functionalism. 
In Extended axiomatic linguistics (Dickins 1998: 351–417), I explored arguments in 
favour of polysemy in more detail, as well as providing a preliminary set of postulates for 
extended axiomatic functionalism which explicitly incorporated polysemy into the theory. 
The major arguments which I put forward in favour of polysemy in that book were: 
 
1. As argued by Lamb (above), Mulder and Hervey’s rejection of polysemy as a 
theoretical notion runs counter to common sense, and produces linguistic descrip-
tions which are intuitively inadequate. 
2.  Our ‘everyday metalanguage’ (Lyons 1991: 32) – that is, the way we talk and 
write about language in a non-technical context – presupposes polysemy, as can 
be seen from a phrase such as ‘funny in both senses’, i.e. both amusing and odd. 
In order to describe such language uses involving everyday metalanguage, we 
need a theoretical-type apparatus which incorporates the notion of polysemy. We 
could either introduce this apparatus as an adjunct to our linguistic theory – as 
would have to be done in the case of standard axiomatic functionalism. Or we 
can fully incorporate it into our linguistic theory, as is done in extended axio-
matic functionalism. All other things being equal, the strategy of full incorpora-
tion is preferable because it eliminates the ad-hoc element inherent in employing 
notions adjunct to the theory proper.  
3. Like aspects of everyday metalanguage, figurative language – and most obvi-
ously metaphor – implies polysemy. This is obvious in the case of a dead meta-
phor (cf. Dickins 1998: 258), what I have elsewhere (Dickins 2005) termed a 
lexicalised metaphor, such as ‘foot’ as in ‘foot of a mountain’. Common sense 
tells us that ‘foot’ here is the same word as ‘foot’ = ‘the part of the vertebrate leg 
below the ankle joint’. The recognition that ‘foot’ as in ‘foot of a mountain’ is 
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metaphorical also implies a relationship between the two meanings, such that 
‘foot’ in ‘foot of a mountain’ is a non-basic sense, while ‘foot’ = ‘the part of the 
vertebrate leg below the ankle joint’ is the basic sense of the word. The same re-
lationships hold also for original, non-lexicalised metaphors (Dickins 2005; 
termed ‘live metaphors’ in Dickins 1998: 260, 286), such as ‘tree’ as in ‘Tom is a 
tree’, for example. Here, we may not know how ‘tree’ is to be precisely inter-
preted. Are we claiming that Tom is a tree because much of his personality re-
mains hidden, just as the extensive root system of a large tree remains hidden be-
neath the ground? Or, in another context, might we be claiming that Tom is a tree 
because he provides moral or psychological protection? (E.g. ‘Tom is a tree 
whose leaves protect us all.’) Regardless of the metaphorical interpretation of 
‘tree’, the word here seems to involve a kind of polysemy: the metaphorical sense 
implies the basic non-metaphorical sense, and the existence of the two senses for 
the single word implies polysemy. 
 
Mulder makes the telling point that in a well-organised theory: 
 
… there is usually one all-pervading principle that characterises the whole approach. All the 
other principles are subordinate to it, or, at least, they are interpreted in terms of it. For Func-
tionalists this all-pervading principle, i.e. their primary point of view, is embodied in A. Mar-
tinet’s dictum: “Function is the criterion of linguistic reality” (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 10). 
 
In Dickins (1998), I argue that the manner in which additional notions, such as 
polysemy, are incorporated into extended axiomatic functionalism yields a theory in which 
the functional principle is applied in a more thorough-going manner than in standard axio-
matic functionalism, such that the notion of distinctive function is generalised to provide 
analyses not only of phonology and grammar (as in standard axiomatic functionalism), but 
also of denotational semantics (more precisely termed delology in extended axiomatic 
functionalism). The resulting theory exhibits complete symmetry between the expression-
side and content-sides of the signum (Dickins 1998: 249), and is thus significantly simpler 
than standard axiomatic functionalism, which is asymmetrical (Dickins 1998: 176). In ad-
dition, I argue that any standard axiomatic-functionalist description can be unambiguously 
recovered from an extended axiomatic-functionalist description; an extended axiomatic-
functionalist description cannot, conversely however, be recovered at all from a standard 
axiomatic-functionalist description (Dickins 1998: 250–251). Extended axiomatic func-
tionalism in this sense subsumes standard axiomatic functionalism. The greater scope, in-
tegration, symmetricality and inclusiveness of extended axiomatic functionalism are all 
features which I believe make it a superior theory to standard axiomatic functionalism. 
The separate application of distinctive function to phonology, grammar and denotational 
semantics (delology) in extended axiomatic functionalism yields three distinct, but inter-
locking, areas of analysis (description). As in standard axiomatic functionalism, cenology 
(in linguistics, phonology) is the analysis of semiotic entities which have form but not con-
tent (i.e. they are ‘empty’ of all semantic considerations). Denotational semantics (delol-
ogy) is the analysis of semiotic entities which have content but no form (i.e. they are enti-
ties of a purely semantic nature). Grammar – what is more precisely termed logology, and 
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with respect to linguistics lexology, in extended axiomatic functionalism – is the analysis 
of semiotic entities which have both form and content – i.e. their physical and their mean-
ingful realisations are both relevant to their identity. 
Phonology in extended axiomatic functionalism is virtually the same as in standard 
axiomatic functionalism. Delology is similar to the plerology (grammar) of standard axio-
matic functionalism, stripped of the association which plerological entities have with for-
mal considerations. Extended axiomatic-functionalist lexology, however, opens up new 
vistas for linguistic analysis, allowing for the incorporation of features such as non-
denotative (connotative) word-sequencing (word order) into an axiomatic-functionalist ap-
proach. 
Extended axiomatic-functionalist lexological analyses are still at a very early stage. 
Within lexology, I have done some work on the morphology (more technically known as 
lexematics) of Sudanese Arabic (Dickins 2006; Dickins forthcoming). The results are much 
more compatible with traditional Arabic morphological notions than are descriptions of 
Arabic produced using standard axiomatic functionalism. 
Lexotactics (comparable to the traditional notion of syntax), and para-lexotactics (fur-
ther grammatical organisation beyond the level of lexotactics/‘syntax’) present more chal-
lenging problems. The following are some preliminary ideas for English. Consider ‘he 
jumped the gun’ in various senses: 1. ‘he jumped over the tubed weapon; 2. ‘he acted pre-
maturely’; and 3. ‘he jumped over the gunman’ (‘gun’ = ‘gunman’, as in ‘he’s a hired 
gun’). Under an extended axiomatic-functionalist analysis, these are all the same lexotacti-
cally (the same morphemes in the same combinations with the same ‘subject-verb-object’ 
lexotactic structure). The fact that ‘jump the gun’ in the sense ‘act prematurely’, for in-
stance, is an idiom is irrelevant here (for a semantic analysis of idioms in terms of what I 
have called allosemic amalgamation, see Dickins 1998: 241–244).  
More interesting is a form like ‘The gun he jumped’ (as in, for example, ‘The gun he 
jumped, but the cannon was too big, so he had to go round it’). I believe that this should be 
regarded as lexotactically the same as ‘He jumped the gun’, albeit that ‘He jumped the 
gun’ can mean 1. ‘he jumped over the tubed weapon’; 2. ‘he acted prematurely’; and 3. ‘he 
jumped over the gunman’, while ‘The gun he jumped’ can only mean, out of the senses 
given above 1. ‘he jumped over the tubed weapon’; and 3. ‘he jumped over the gunman’ (it 
cannot have the idiomatic sense 2. ‘he acted prematurely’). If this proposal is reasonable, 
the analytical domain of lexotactics would correspond closely to that of traditional syntax – 
covering areas of traditional syntactic concern such as the analysis of subject, verb and ob-
ject for English. 
Para-lexotactics by definition deals with the organisation of grammatical entities be-
yond the lexotactic, and will certainly include intonation within its domain. It appears, 
however, that para-lexotactics also includes word order patterns which are functional, and 
which go beyond the analytical notions covered by lexotactics. Thus, ‘He jumped the gun’ 
and ‘The gun he jumped’ are, as argued, the same lexotactically. There is a grammatical 
difference between them: this, however, is para-lexotactic, rather than lexotactic. 
That this kind of word order difference should be part of grammar seems clear in an ex-
tended axiomatic-functionalist approach. Signa (i.e. grammatical entities) have both a for-
mal and a semantic aspect. The word order difference between ‘He jumped the gun’ and 
‘The gun he jumped’ clearly involves a formal difference: in the first case ‘the gun’ is real-
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ised as the end of the sentence, and in the second at the beginning. This word order differ-
ence also involves semantic difference: one obvious semantic difference is that in ‘He 
jumped the gun’, ‘jump […] the gun’ can be interpreted idiomatically, but in ‘The gun he 
jumped’ it cannot. Of more generalisable semantic importance however, is that the fact that 
in ‘The gun he jumped’, ‘The gun’ is an emphatic, contextually known, element. In func-
tional-sentence perspective terms, ‘The gun’ might be described as an emphatic theme. 
While there is apparently no denotative meaning difference between ‘He jumped the gun’ 
and ‘The gun he jumped’ (at least if we ignore the idiomatic sense of the former), there is a 
connotative meaning difference. Mulder (e.g. 1989: 80, 148, 164, 195–196) specifically 
excludes connotative meaning, of which functional sentence perspective features are an 
aspect, from the scope of standard axiomatic functionalism. Inasmuch as these features be-
long to the system of conventions for communication, extended axiomatic functionalism, 
by contrast, recognises them as semiotic (cf. Def. 1c in both standard and extended axio-
matic functionalism, ‘Semiotic system’ for ‘system of conventions for communication’, 
Mulder 1989: 436; also below). 
The account which I have sketched out above of the distinction between aspects of lexo-
tactics and para-lexotactics in English is somewhat hazy, and draws on traditional distinc-
tions in English between subject, verb and object to identify a dividing line between lexo-
tactics and para-lexotactics. This is properly speaking unsatisfactory. Functionalist linguis-
tics (in the sense in which the term ‘functionalist’ is used in axiomatic functionalism) at-
tempts to provide ex nihilo linguistic descriptions: its goal is not to explicate or develop 
more traditional accounts of languages. 
There may, however, be a more coherent basis to the way in which lexotactics and para-
lexotactics have been distinguished above in relation to English clausal grammar. There is 
a certain correlation (albeit imperfect) in the account which I have given between denota-
tive meaning : lexotactics and connotative meaning : para-lexotactics. There is no theoreti-
cal bar to lexotactics conveying connotative meaning, or to para-lexotactics conveying de-
notative meaning. We cannnot, therefore, simply identify the two levels on these grounds. 
In this particular instance, however, the fact that there are two clearly distinct types of 
meaning involved (denotative meaning vs. connotative meaning – and specifically ‘func-
tional-sentence-perspective-type’ meaning) combined with the fact that there are two fairly 
obvious ways of looking at the structuring of the material (‘abstract structure’-oriented vs. 
word-order-oriented) suggests that the distinction between what is lexotactic and what is 
para-lexotactic has at least been drawn at an appropriate point.  
The account of aspects of lexotactics and para-lexotactics which I have given in relation 
to English clause structure above is no more than an initial sketch. It also fails to take into 
account intonation. As a functional feature, intonation, as noted above, is certainly part of 
para-lexotactics (fairly obviously, it operates independently from any kind of structuring of 
words into phrases). However, there can be a very close relationship between the ordering 
of words and intonation structures. Thus, in ‘The gun he jumped’, ‘The gun’ and ‘he 
jumped’ must each constitute a separate intonation unit. For a proper extended axiomatic-
functionalist account, it would be necessary to ascertain which intonation features are func-
tional, that is ‘separately relevant to the purport of which [they are] a part’ (Def 1a; Mulder 
1989: 436; Def. 1a below). That is to say, we would need to determine which intonation 
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features have a semiotic identity proper and are not simply additional realisational features 
of para-lexotactic structures which are more obviously realised by word order differences.  
The difficulty of defining what belongs to lexotactics from what belongs to para-
lexotactics reflects a more general issue of the scientificity of extended axiomatic-
functionalist descriptions. Scientific theories yield descriptions which are in principle re-
futable: we could in principle find data which demonstrate that the proposed description is 
wrong (e.g. Popper 1973: 38). Mulder consistently intended axiomatic functionalism to be 
a scientific theory of semiotics and linguistics. Because of this, he excluded areas such as 
connotation which he regarded as unamenable to rigorous scientific enquiry. The analyses 
produced under an extended axiomatic-functionalist lexology (morphology/lexematics, 
lexotactics/‘syntax’, and para-lexotactics) are not rigorously scientific: in some case at 
least, they do not yield analyses (descriptions) which are unambiguously refutable. I have 
explored this with respect to the morphology/lexematics of Sudanese Arabic in Dickins 
(2006), and have discussed it from a more theoretical perspective with respect to both 
morphology/lexematics and lexotactics in Dickins (1998). The difficulties can in fact be 
seen in Lamb’s counter-argument to Mulder and Hervey’s ‘fellow’/‘bloke’ and 
/aiðr/~/iRðr/ example above. Lamb is quite reasonable to argue that similarity of expres-
sion allows us to claim that /aiðr/~/iRðr/ are a single sign (signum), and that the lack of 
similarity of expression of ‘fellow’ and ‘bloke’ means that we have to regard these two 
words as two different signs (signa). This, however, begs the question of how dissimilar 
two synonymous forms would have to be for us to be forced to analyse them as different 
signs (signa). It seems to me clear that there can be no precise answer to this question: at 
the margins judgements of allomorphy vs. sign difference (homosemy; cf. Def. 26e below) 
have an irreducibly unscientific element. (For further discussion, see Dickins 1998: 169–
178.) 
More generally, I believe that Mulder’s claim that semiotics, including linguistics, is a 
fully scientific discipline – or at least a potentially fully scientific discipline – is open to 
doubt. There are many aspects of linguistics, even within standard axiomatic functional-
ism, where I believe descriptive claims are not unambiguously refutable, e.g. phonematics 
(for discussion, see Dickins 2007: 109–111). In this regard, it is noteworthy that while 
Mulder and Hervey in principle seek to remove connotative meaning from the domain of 
standard axiomatic functionalism, they unambiguously incorporate intonation within the 
theory (treating it at the level of para-plerotactics and para-phonotactics; e.g. Mulder 1989: 
388–389, Def. 18b; 390, Def. 19a; see also Def. 18b, Def. 19a below). Intonation patterns 
are generally, however, regarded as having connotative rather than denotative meanings. 
As such, intonation should be expected to fall outside the domain of standard axiomatic 
functionalism. 
Extended axiomatic functionalism, I have argued, offers a broader-scope semiotic (in-
cluding linguistic) analysis than standard axiomatic functionalism, based on a more sym-
metrical and therefore simpler overall theory. While extended axiomatic-functionalist 
analyses may in some instances be less scientific than those of standard axiomatic func-
tionalism, this is justified by the greater common-sense adequacy and scope of the ex-
tended axiomatic-functionalist analyses. 
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Introduction to the postulates 
 
The following postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism are based on the provi-
sional postulates given in Dickins (1998: 355–417, and are intended to be maximally com-
parable with those for standard axiomatic functionalism in The strategy of linguistics 
(Mulder and Hervey 1980: 40–63) and in Foundations of axiomatic linguistics (Mulder 
1989: 435–457) as well as Hervey’s postulates for axiomatic-functionalist semantics in The 
strategy of linguistics (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 203–211).  
Accordingly, I have done two things in drawing up these postulates. Firstly, I have 
largely confined the postulates to notions in extended axiomatic functionalism which cor-
respond to those already found in standard axiomatic functionalism, only introducing novel 
notions where these are essential for an understanding of extended axiomatic functional-
ism. This means that a small number of notions which I have discussed elsewhere (e.g. 
protocolised allomorph in Dickins 1989: 51, 131) are not formally defined here. Secondly, 
I have tried as far as possible to maintain the order of the postulates found in Mulder and 
Hervey (1980) and Mulder (1989). Where there are differences between these two I have 
attempted to follow the order of Mulder (1989), rather than that of Mulder and Hervey 
(1980). Since Mulder (1989) does not include postulates for axiomatic-functionalist se-
mantics, the postulates here which correspond to the postulates for axiomatic-functionalist 
semantics (i.e. Axiom F and associated Definitions) are to be related directly to Hervey’s 
semantic postulates (Mulder and Hervey 1980).  
In the case of those definitions ensuing from Axiom F, I have placed a letter F before 
the main definition “label”. Thus Def. F1a provides a definition of utterance, correspond-
ing to Hervey’s Def. 1a for utterance (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 203). This preceding letter 
F makes it possible to distinguish definition labels linked to Hervey’s semantic definitions 
(Mulder and Hervey 1980: 435–457) from definition labels linked to definitions in Mulder 
(1989; also Mulder and Hervey 1980: 40–63). Thus, in the current Postulates, Def. 1a, 
which provides a definition of ‘functional’ (corresponding to Def. 1a in Mulder 1989: 436, 
and Def. 1a in Mulder and Hervey 1980: 41), is distinguished, by virtue of being given a 
different label, from Def. F1a. 
The attempt to make the order of the present postulates cohere with the orders in Mulder 
and Hervey (1980) and Mulder (1989) has the disadvantage that it yields a version of the 
postulates whose order is in some cases less than ideal for the theory which it presents. It 
is, however, more useful, I believe, to provide a formal presentation of extended axiomatic 
functionalism which is maximally comparable with standard axiomatic functionalism than 
one which displays maximum internal elegance.  
The postulates for axiomatic functionalism provide a formal exposition of the theory, 
and comprise two types of statement: (i) a set of axioms, (ii) a set of definitions. The axi-
oms are the “primitive statements” (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 33). Their function is to in-
troduce new theoretical propositions (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 33). Axioms may con-
tain both primitive and non-primitive terms, a primitive term being “a term whose further 
definition, we are satisfied, would add nothing further to our understanding of that term” 
(Mulder and Hervey 1980: 25). Definitions, by contrast, “do not introduce new proposi-
tions, but merely introduce technical terms by linking them to notions in the theory” 
(Mulder and Hervey 1980: 33). The chains of definitions accompanying each axiom “ulti-
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mately reduce the terms in these axioms to primitive terms” (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
33). That is to say, while definitions may contain terms which are further defined by other 
definitions, the defined terms ultimately lead to undefined, primitive terms in the axioms or 
other definitions. This is a necessary state of affairs; the alternative would be to have a the-
ory of infinite length, in which at least some terms were defined and their definitions fur-
ther defined ad infinitum. 
On the basis of the postulates (axioms and definitions) it is also possible to deduce an 
unlimited number of theorematic notions (theorems), i.e. notions which follow logically 
from the axioms and definitions. Such theorematic notions can themselves be designated 
by technical terms. Any technical term, therefore, which does not appear in the postulates, 
but whose definition can be derived logically from notions in the postulates is a theore-
matic term. Those terms introduced in Dickins (1998; esp. Chapter Three), for example, 
which are properly defined via terms in the postulates, but which do not themselves appear 
as terms in the postulates are thus theorematic terms. 
Within the postulates, the fact that a term is theoretically primitive (regardless of 
whether it is part of an axiom or a definition) does not preclude its further discussion and 
elucidation outside the formal framework of the theory. That is to say, in the above defini-
tion of a primitive term as “a term whose further definition, we are satisfied, would add 
nothing further to our understanding of that term”, the phrase “whose further definition” is 
to be understood as meaning “whose further definition within the postulates”. This is only 
common sense. The alternative would be to impose a ban on informal discussion of terms 
in the theory - something which would hardly aid the comprehensibility or scrutability of 
axiomatic functionalism. In the earlier version of the postulates in particular (Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 41–63, 203–211), but also in the more recent version (Mulder 1989: 435–
457), some postulates are accompanied by “explanations” (Mulder 1989: 435). In these 
postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism, I have retained such explanations, par-
ticularly for the axioms, since they provide useful guidance to the scope and direction of 
particular features of the theory. To make it clearer, however that these explanatory state-
ments are not part of the postulates themselves, I have in all cases introduced them by the 
word Comment, and indented the explanatory material on both the left and right margins. 
It should be noted that definitions may be applied at both the level of theory and that of 
description (cf. Dickins 1998: 35–39). They are, however, normally stated in terms of their 
applicability to the level of description. Thus, system ontology (Def. 3a1a), for example, is 
not only “logology (Def. 2a4a), cenology (Def. 2b1a), and delology (Def. 2c1a)”, i.e. it is 
not only concerned with description at these levels. It can also be regarded as the name of 
the sub-theory in terms of which relevant descriptions are made. In a number of cases, 
however, it seemed more sensible to frame definitions in purely theory-oriented terms. 
Thus, allomorphics (Def. 24b1b), for example, is defined as “the sub-theory within the sig-
num ontology (Def. F4.4) dealing with the description of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 
24b1a) and related notions”. 
The main body of the postulates is preceded by five preliminary definitions, for lex 
(Def. 0a), phon (Def. 0b), and graph (Def. 0c) (as stems), linguistics (Def. 0d), and ont 
(Def. 0e) (as a stem). The first three of these terms, lex, phon, and graph provide defini-
tions which allow for the generation of set of terms for spoken natural language from gen-
eral semiotic terms. The fourth, linguistics, defines the overall scope of extended axiomatic 
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functionalism in relation to natural language. This usage of ‘linguistics’ as a technical term 
within extended axiomatic functionalism corresponds roughly to what has elsewhere (e.g. 
Dickins 12; 310–315) been referred to as ‘core-linguistics’. The technical use of the term 
‘linguistics’ here does not imply a wish to replace more general usages of ‘linguistics’ (cf. 
definitions of ‘linguistics’ in Crystal 2003) – just as, for example, the use of a term such as 
‘theme’ as a technical term in Functional Sentence Perspective does not replace more gen-
eral usages of ‘theme’ (e.g. in “the theme of this book is as follows”). The fifth preliminary 
definition, for ont, provides a cover term for notions in the theory generally. The prelimi-
nary definitions do not form part of the postulates for standard axiomatic functionalism in 
any versions. They are included in these provisional postulates in order to simplify subse-
quent axioms and definitions, by removing specific reference from these axioms and defi-
nitions to natural language in all cases, and to generalising cover terms in most cases. 
To make these postulates easier to relate to the postulates for standard axiomatic func-
tionalism, I have included full references to both versions of the postulates for standard 
axiomatic functionalism (including Hervey’s postulates for standard axiomatic-
functionalist semantics). In order to make the current postulates easier to use, I have in-
cluded full internal cross-references. The figures in the Appendix to the postulates, Figure 
1 Extended axiomatic functionalism: semiotics and Figure 2 Extended axiomatic function-
alism: linguistics, provide a visual representation of the main entities and notions of the 
theory, and are intended to make it easier for the reader to see how key aspects of it relate 
to one another.  
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Postulates for Extended Axiomatic Functionalism 
 
Comment: The general organisation of the postulates is as follows: Axioms A–F 
(and ensuing Definitions for each Axiom) together cover the whole of the the-
ory of extended axiomatic functionalism.  
Axiom A states the all-pervading point of view of the theory.  
Axioms B, C and D deal mainly with the system ontology (Def. 3a1a). 
Axioms E and F deal with the signum ontology (Def. F4.4). 
For a corresponding statement of the scope of each of the axioms in standard 
axiomatic functionalism, cf. Mulder (1989: 457). 
 
 
Preliminary definitions 
 
Def. 0a. ‘lex’ (as stem) for ‘log (as stem) in natural language throughout’. 
Def. 0b. ‘phon’ (as stem) for ‘cen (as stem) in spoken natural language throughout’. 
Comment: In accordance with the intention of the preliminary definitions, no 
terms involving lex, phon or graph are included in the definitions below. All 
terms for natural language can be generated by substituting phon for cen, and 
lex for log throughout the definitions. This allows a rather neater presentation of 
the postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism than was possible for the 
versions of standard axiomatic functionalism. 
Def. 0c. ‘graph’ (as stem) for ‘cen (as stem) in written natural language throughout’. 
Comment: In accordance with the intention of the preliminary definitions, no 
terms involving lex, phon or graph are included in the definitions below. All 
terms for natural language can be generated by substituting phon or graph for 
cen, and lex for log throughout the definitions. This allows a rather neater pres-
entation of the postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism than was possi-
ble for the versions of standard axiomatic functionalism. 
Def. 0d. ‘Linguistics’ for ‘semiotics (Def. F4.5) in natural language’. 
Def. 0e. ‘ont’ (as stem) for ‘log, cen, or del (as stems) throughout’. 
Comment: In principle the preliminary definition of ont should allow for the 
elimination of terms involving ont throughout. In practice, a number of terms 
involving ont have been retained; e.g. allont (Def. 26o), onto (Def. 3a1), onto-
tactics (Def. 3b), etc. A more radical strategy would be to define log, cen, and 
del as varieties of ont here, and to eliminate the use of the terms log, cen, and 
del in the postulates wherever possible. I have not adopted this strategy, as it 
would have meant significantly altering the form of the postulates, and render-
ing them far less easily comparable with versions of the postulates for standard 
axiomatic functionalism. 
 
 
Axiom A. All features (Def. 1c1) in semiotic sets are functional (Def. 1a) (cf. Mulder 
and Hervey 1980: 41, Axiom A; Mulder 1989: 436, Axiom A). 
Comment: Axiom A states the point of view of the theory, i.e. the functional 
principle. The definitions under Axiom A give an interpretation to the axiom, 
and provide a system-ontological (cf. Def. 3a1a) definition of semiotic system 
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(Def. 1c, Def. 5). The reason why the term ‘semiotic system’ (Def. 1c, Def. 5) is 
not used in the axiom itself is that otherwise the recognition of functionality for 
features (Def. 1c1) in sub-systems (cf. Def. 1b) of semiotic systems (Def. 1c, 
Def. 5) (e.g. cenology (Def. 2b1a), cenotactics (Def. 2b1c), logology (Def. 
2a4a), logotactics (Def. 2a4c), etc.) would be precluded (adapted from Mulder 
1989: 436). 
 
Def. 1a. ‘Functional’ for ‘separately relevant to the purport of the whole to which it 
is a part’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 41, Def.1a; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 
1a). 
Def. 1b. ‘System’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) set of features (Def. 1c1) with a 
common purport’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 41, Def.1b; Mulder 1989: 
436, Def. 1b). 
Def. 1b1. ‘Self-contained’ for ‘representing all relative dependencies (cf. Def. 6a, Def. 
6b, Def. 11a, Def. 11b, Def. 11c) of its members as members of the set in 
question’.   
Comment: The notions functional (Def. 1a.) and self-contained can be applied to 
combinations (Def. 6c) (of items) as well as to sets. In the case of combinations 
(Def. 6c) the term members has to be replaced by constituents (Def. 7f1) 
(adapted from Mulder and Hervey 1980: 41, Def. 1b1; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 
1b1). 
Def. 1c. ‘Semiotic system’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) of conventions for communication’.  
Comment: Alternative definition to Def. 5 (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, 
Def. 1c; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 1c). 
Def. 1c1. ‘Features’ for ‘elements, analytical properties of elements, or relations be-
tween elements or properties of elements’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, 
Def. 1c1; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 1c1). 
Def. 1c2. ‘Entity’ for ‘element or discrete disjunct analytical property of element’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 1c2; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 1c2). 
Def. 1c2a. ‘Basic entity’ or ‘minimum entity’ for ‘entity in ontomics (Def. 3a1a1), on-
tidics (Def. 3a1a2), ontematics (Def. 3a1b), or ontotactics (Def. 3b) which is 
not further analysable at that level’.  
Comment: Basic entity (or minimum entity) means essentially the same thing as 
ultimate constituent (Def. 7f1b). There is, however, a difference in point of 
view. Ultimate constituent (Def. 7f1b) implies a decompositional analysis, 
whereas basic entity implies a compositional analysis. It is theorematic that in 
ontomics (Def. 3a1a1) and ontidics (Def. 3a1a2), the basic entity is also the unit 
(Def. 9e). See also: base (Def. 20a). 
Def. 1c3. ‘Semiotic entity’ for ‘entity (Def. 1c2) in semiotic system (Def. 1c, Def. 
5)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 1c3; Mulder 1989: 437, Def. 
1c3). 
Comment: In Foundations of axiomatic linguistics, Mulder includes a Def. 1d.  
“ ‘Communication’ for ‘subjective (i.e. involving choice or optionality) convey-
ance of information’. This rules out ‘labels’, ‘names’ or ‘designations’, not to be 
confused with ‘communicating’ these or about these, from being ‘communica-
tion’ in our sense” (Mulder 1989: 437). For reasons why I have excluded this 
definition from this set of postulates, see Dickins 1998: 418; Note 1). 
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Axiom B. Semiotic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5) contain simple (cf. Def. 4a), and may 
contain complex (cf. Def. 6c) ordered (cf. Def. 4b2), or complex (cf. Def. 
6c) unordered (cf. Def. 4b1) logos (Def. 2a4), cenos (Def. 2b1), and delos 
(Def. 2c1) (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Axiom B; Mulder 1989: 437, 
Axiom B). 
Comment: Axiom B is the most powerful axiom of the whole theory. It har-
bours (after being given an interpretation by means of definitions that follow it) 
the theory of semiotic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5) (which is one of the sub-
theories), as well as almost the whole of the system ontology (Def. 3a1a) of any 
semiotic system (Def. 1c, Def. 5) (i.e. cenology (Def. 2b1a), logology (Def. 
2a4a) and delology (Def. 2c1a)) with the exception of the para-ontotactic (cf. 
Def. 19f) sub-systems (Def. 1b). The latter are covered by Axioms C and D. 
The system ontology (Def. 3a1a) is unfolded in Definitions 2–16c, together with 
the basic methodology for descriptions in logology (Def. 2a4a), cenology (Def. 
2b1a), and delology (Def. 2c1a). Definitions 2–2a3b and 2b develop that part of 
the theory of indices which is relevant to semiotic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5) 
(adapted from Mulder 1989: 437–8). 
 
Def. 2. ‘Index’ for ‘class of items with information-value (Def. 2a)’ (cf. Mulder 
1989: 437, Def. 2). 
Comment: Index is here formally defined as a class. The term “index”, however, 
can also be used for an item (i.e. member) of the class making up the index. See 
Dickins 1998: 418; Note 2; also Def. F4, below. 
Def. 2a. ‘Information-value’ or ‘specific set of potential interpretations’ (cf. Mulder 
and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 2a). 
Def. 2a1. ‘Signum’ (symbolised: ‘S’) for ‘sign (Def. 2a2)’ or ‘symbol (Def. 2a3)’. Al-
ternative definition: ‘Semiotic entity (Def. 1c3) which has both morphontic 
(cf. Def. F3h) and semantic (cf. Def. F4.3) aspects’. Also: ‘Entity in signum 
ontology (Def. F4.4) corresponding to logo (Def. 2a4) in system ontology 
(Def. 3a1a).  
Comment: Alternative definition to Def. 24 (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, 
Def. 2a; Mulder 1989: 437, Def. 2a1). 
Def. 2a2. ‘Sign’ for ‘signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) the information-value (Def. 2a) of all 
of whose allosemes (Def. 24c1a) is determined by wholly fixed conven-
tions’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a1; Mulder 1989: 437, Def. 
2a2). 
Comment: Cf. extended axiomatic functionalism Def. 2c. 
Def. 2a3. ‘Symbol’ for ‘signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) the information-value (Def. 2a) of 
at least one of whose allosemes (Def. 24c1a) is not determined by wholly 
fixed conventions, i.e to which a temporary information-value (Def. 2a) can 
be attached by a definition’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a2; 
Mulder 1989: 437, Def. 2a3). 
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Def. 2a3a. ‘Proper symbol’ for ‘symbol (Def. 2a3) with partially fixed conventional 
information-value (Def. 2a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a2a; 
Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 2a3a). 
Def. 2a3b. ‘Nonce symbol’ for ‘symbol (Def. 2a3) with wholly non-fixed conventional 
information-value (Def. 2a), i.e. with no fixed information-value (Def. 2a) at 
all’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a2b; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 
2a3b). 
Comment: Definitions for both proper symbol (Def. 2a3a) and nonce symbol 
(Def. 2a3b) have been included here. However, it may be that the notion nonce 
symbol in particular should be excluded from the postulates. As Shimizu and 
Lamb note, “The subdivision of symbols into proper symbols and nonce sym-
bols ... we both consider problematic” (Shimizu and Lamb 1985: 118; cf. Dick-
ins 1998: 13–16). 
Def. 2a4. ‘Logo’ for ‘entity (Def. 1c2) in system ontology (Def. 3a1a) corresponding 
to a signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) in system ontology (Def. F4.4)’ (cf. Mulder 
and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a3; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 2a4). 
Def. 2a4a. ‘Logology’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) of logos (Def. 2a4)’. This may be either a 
simple (cf. Def. 4a) logology (logomics (Def. 2a4a1) or logidics (Def. 
2a4a2)) or a complex (cf. Def. 6c) logology (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
42, Def. 2a3a; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2a4c). 
Comment: Logology is the level of description in the system ontology (Def. 
3a1a) which corresponds to logologics (Def. F1b2a4) (also morphologics (Def. 
F1b1a3) and semologics (Def. F1b2a3)) in the system ontology (Def. F4.4). 
Def. 2a4a1. ‘Logomics’ for ‘simple (cf. Def. 4a) logology (Def. 2a4a) which does not 
interlock (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a complex (cf. Def. 6c) logology (Def. 2a4a)’. 
Comment: It follows that a logology (Def. 2a4a) which has a logomics will have 
only a logomics; i.e. the logology (Def. 2a4a) will consist entirely of an unor-
dered set of logomes (Def. 8b5) in opposition to one another. 
Def. 2a4a2. ‘Logidics’ for ‘simple (cf. Def. 4a) logology (Def. 2a4a) which interlocks 
(cf. Def. 3c2a) with a complex (cf. Def. 6c) logology (Def. 2a4a), i.e. which 
interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a logematics (Def. 2a4b) or with a logidotac-
tics (Def. 2a4c1)’. 
Def. 2a4b. ‘Logematics’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) unordered (cf. Def. 4b1) logology 
(Def. 2a4a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a3b; Mulder 1989: 
438, Def. 2a4a). 
Comment: A logematics interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a logemotactics (Def. 
2a4c2). 
Def. 2a4c. ‘Logotactics’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) ordered (cf. Def. 4b2) logology 
(Def. 2a4a)’. Alternative definition: ‘logidotactics (Def. 2a4c1) or logemo-
tactics (Def. 2a4c2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a3c; Mulder 
1989: 438, Def. 2a4b). 
Comment: A logotactics interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a para-logotactics (Def. 
19c). 
Def. 2a4c1. ‘Logidotactics’ for ‘logotactics (Def. 2a4c) in a compound (cf. Def. 5a) 
logology (Def. 2a4a) which does not include a logematics (Def. 2a4b)’. 
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Def. 2a4c2. ‘Logemotactics’ for ‘logotactics (Def. 2a4c) in a compound (cf. Def. 5a) 
logology (Def. 2a4a) which includes a logematics (Def. 2a4b)’. 
Def. 2b. ‘Figura’ for ‘semiotic entity (Def. 1c3) which has only a morphontic (cf. 
Def. F3h) aspect’. Alternative definition: ‘Entity in signum ontology (Def. 
F4.4) corresponding to a ceno (Def. 2b1) in system ontology (Def. 
3a1a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 2b; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 
2b). 
Def. 2b1. ‘Ceno’ for ‘entity (Def. 1c2) in system ontology (Def. 3a1a) corresponding 
to a figura (Def. 2b) in signum ontology (Def. F4.4)’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 2b1; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2b1). 
Def. 2b1a. ‘Cenology’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) of cenos (Def. 2b1)’. This may be either a 
simple (cf. Def. 4a) cenology (cenomics (Def. 2b1a1) or cenidics (Def. 
2b1a2)) or a complex (cf. Def. 6c) cenology (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
43, Def. 2b1a; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2b1c). 
Comment: Cenology is the level of description in the system ontology (Def. 
3a1a) to which corresponds cenologics (Def. F3g) in the signum ontology (Def. 
F4.4). 
Def. 2b1a1. ‘Cenomics’ for ‘simple (cf. Def. 4a) cenology (Def. 2b1a) which does not 
interlock (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a complex (cf. Def. 6c) cenology (Def. 2b1a)’. 
Comment: It follows that a cenology (Def. 2b1a) which has a cenomics will 
have only a cenomics; i.e. the cenology (Def. 2b1a) will consist entirely of an 
unordered set of cenomes (Def. 8a5) in opposition to one another. 
Def. 2b1a2. ‘Cenidics’ for ‘simple (cf. Def. 4a) cenology (Def. 2b1a) which interlocks 
(cf. Def. 3c2a) with a complex (cf. Def. 6c) cenology (Def. 2b1a), i.e. which 
interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a cenematics (Def. 2b1b) or with a cenidotac-
tics (Def. 2b1c1)’. 
Def. 2b1b. ‘Cenematics’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) unordered (cf. Def. 4b1) cenology 
(Def. 2b1a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 2b1b; Mulder 1989: 
438, Def. 2b1a). 
Comment: A cenematics interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a cenemotactics (Def. 
2b1c2). 
Def. 2b1c. ‘Cenotactics’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) ordered (cf. Def. 4b2) cenology 
(Def. 2b1a)’. Alternative definition: ‘cenidotactics (Def. 2b1c1) or cenemo-
tactics’ (Def. 2b1c2) (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 2b1c; Mulder 
1989: 438, Def. 2b1b). 
Comment: A cenotactics interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a para-cenotactics (Def. 
18c). 
Def. 2b1c1. ‘Cenidotactics’ for ‘cenotactics (Def. 2b1c) in a compound (cf. Def. 5a) 
cenology (Def. 2b1a) which does not include a cenematics (Def. 2b1b)’. 
Def. 2b1c2. ‘Cenemotactics’ for ‘cenotactics (Def. 2b1c) in a compound (cf. Def. 5a) 
cenology (Def. 2b1a) which includes a cenematics (Def. 2b1b)’. 
Def. 2b1d. ‘Cenological form’ (symbolised: p) for ‘notion in signum ontology (Def. 
F4.4), corresponding to feature (Def. 1c1) potentially belonging to cenology 
(Def. 2b1a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 3a4; Mulder 1989: 438, 
Def. 2b1d). Alternative definition to Def. 23. Formal definition: p = 
{fi...nRd}. 
 15
Dickins : Extended Axiomatic Functionalism: Postulates 
Def. 2c. ‘Denotation’ for ‘semiotic entity (Def. 1c3) which has only a semantic (cf. 
Def. F4.3) aspect’. Alternative definition ‘Entity in signum ontology (Def. 
F4.4) corresponding to delo (Def. 2c1) in system ontology (Def. 3a1a)’.  
Comment: Cf. standard axiomatic functionalism Def. 2a2a. 
Def. 2c1. ‘Delo’ for ‘entity (Def. 1c2) in system ontology (Def. 3a1a) corresponding 
to a denotation (Def. 2c) in signum ontology (Def. F4.4)’. 
Def. 2c1a. ‘Delology’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) of delos (Def. 2c1)’. This may be either a 
simple (cf. Def. 4a) delology (delomics (Def. 2c1a1) or delidics (Def. 
2c1a2)) or a complex (cf. Def. 6c) delology.  
Comment: Delology is the level of description in the system ontology (Def. 
3a1a) to which corresponds delologics (Def. F4.2) in the signum ontology (Def. 
F4.4). 
Def. 2c1a1. ‘Delomics’ for ‘simple (cf. Def. 4a) delology (Def. 2c1a) which does not 
interlock (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a complex (cf. Def. 6c) delology (Def. 2c1a)’. 
Comment: It follows that a delology (Def. 2c1a) which has a delomics will have 
only a delomics; i.e. the delology (Def. 2c1a) will consist entirely of an unor-
dered set of delomes (Def. 8c5) in opposition to one another. 
Def. 2c1a2. ‘Delidics’ for ‘simple (cf. Def. 4a) delology (Def. 2c1a) which interlocks 
(cf. Def. 3c2a) with a complex (cf. Def. 6c) delology (Def. 2c1a), i.e. with a 
delematics (Def. 2c1b) or with a delidotactics (Def. 2c1c1)’. 
Def. 2c1b. ‘Delematics’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) unordered (cf. Def. 4b1) delology 
(Def. 2c1a)’.  
Comment: A delematics interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a delemotactics (Def. 
2c1c2). 
Def. 2c1c. ‘Delotactics’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) ordered (cf. Def. 4b2) delology 
(Def. 2c1a)’. Alternative definition: ‘delidotactics (Def. 2c1c1) or delemo-
tactics (Def. 2c1c2)’.  
Comment: A delotactics interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with a para-delotactics (Def. 
18i). 
Def. 2c1c1. ‘Delidotactics’ for ‘delotactics (Def. 2c1c) in a compound (cf. Def. 5a) del-
ology (Def. 2c1a) which does not include a delematics (Def. 2c1b)’. 
Def. 2c1c2. ‘Delemotactics’ for ‘delotactics (Def. 2c1c) in a compound (cf. Def. 5a) 
delology (Def. 2c1a) which includes a delematics (Def. 2c1b)’. 
Def. 2c1d. ‘Delological form’ (symbolised: q) for ‘notion in signum ontology (Def. 
F4.4), corresponding to feature (Def. 1c1) potentially belonging to delology 
(Def. 2c1a)’. Formal definition: q= {gi...nRe}. Alternative definition to Def. 
23c.  
Comment: Def. 3a in Mulder and Hervey (1980: 43) and Mulder (1989: 438), 
which provides a definition for phonology, and more generally for forms with 
phon, is rendered unnecesary in the extended version by the inclusion of Def. 
0b. 
Def. 3a1. ‘Onto’ for ‘logo (Def. 2a4), ceno (Def. 2b1), or delo (Def. 2c1)’. 
Def. 3a1a. ‘System ontology’ for ‘logology (Def. 2a4a), cenology (Def. 2b1a), and 
delology (Def. 2c1a)’ (cf. Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2b2). 
Comment: Cf. extended axiomatic functionalism, Def. 0a, Def. 0b. 
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Def. 3a1a1. ‘Ontomics’ for ‘logomics (Def. 2a4a1), cenomics (Def. 2b1a1), or delomics 
(Def. 2c1a1)’.  
Comment: It follows that a system ontology (Def. 3a1a) which has an ontomics 
will have only an ontomics; i.e. the system ontology (Def. 3a1a) will consist en-
tirely of an unordered set of ontomes (Def. 8d5) in opposition to one another. 
Def. 3a1a2. ‘Ontidics’ for ‘logidics (Def. 2a4a2), cenidics (Def. 2b1a2), or delidics (Def. 
2c1a2)’. 
Def. 3a1b. ‘Ontematics’ for ‘logematics (Def. 2a4b), cenematics (Def. 2b1b), or 
delematics (Def. 2c1b)’. 
Comment: An ontematics interlocks (cf. Def. 3c2a) with an ontemotactics (Def. 
3a1c2). 
Def. 3a1c1. ‘Ontidotactics’ for ‘logidotactics (Def. 2a4c1), cenidotactics (Def. 2b1c1), 
or delidotactics (Def. 2c1c1)’. 
Def. 3a1c2. ‘Ontemotactics’ for ‘logemotactics (Def. 2a4c2), cenemotactics (Def. 
2b1c2) or delemotactics (Def. 2c1c2)’. 
Def. 3a1d. ‘Ontological form’ for ‘cenological form (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23), or delologi-
cal form (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c)’. 
Def. 3b. ‘Ontotactics’ or ‘articulation’ for ‘logotactics (Def. 2a4c), cenotactics (Def. 
2b1c), or delotactics (Def. 2c1c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 3b; 
Mulder 1989: 439, Def. 3b). 
Comment: An ontotactics interlocks (Def. 3c2a) with a para-ontotactics (Def. 
19f). 
Def. 3c. ‘Double articulation (Def. 3b)’ for ‘both logotactics (Def. 2a4c) and ceno-
tactics (Def. 2b1c), or both logotactics (Def. 2a4c) and delotactics (Def. 
2c1c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 3c; Mulder 1989: 439, Def. 
3c). 
Def. 3c1. ‘Language’ for ‘semiotic system (Def. 1c, Def. 5) with double articulation 
(Def. 3c) with respect to both morphontics (Def. 3h) and semantics (Def. 
F4.3)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 3c1; Mulder 1989: 439, Def. 
3c1). 
Comment: That is to say, a “language” in this technical sense has a cenotactics 
(Def. 2b1c), a logotactics (Def. 2a4c), and a delotactics (Def. 2c1c). 
Def. 3c2. ‘Proper language (Def. 3c1)’ for ‘semiotic system (Def. 1c, Def. 5) with a 
cenology (Def. 2b1a) containing both a cenematics (Def. 2b1b) and a ceno-
tactics (Def. 2b1c), a delology (Def. 2c1a) containing both a delematics 
(Def. 2c1b) and a delotactics (Def. 2c1c), and a logology (Def. 2a4a) con-
taining both a logematics (Def. 2a4b) and a logotactics (Def. 2a4c)’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 3c2; Mulder 1989: 439, Def. 3c2). 
Comment: All natural languages known to date are proper languages, but not 
necessarily vice versa. Natural languages, in addition, incorporate para-
ontotactics (Def. 19f), but so do some other semiotic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5) 
(adapted from Mulder 1989: 439). In Foundations of axiomatic linguistics 
Mulder (1989: 439) implies that all semiotic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5) by defini-
tion have para-tactic levels (cf. para-ontotactics: Def. 19f). This is not the posi-
tion adopted in earlier versions of the theory (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43), 
nor is it the position adopted in the extended version. 
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Def. 3c2a. ‘Interlocking’ for ‘in system ontology (Def. 3a1a) the one system (Def. 1b) 
providing the forms of the realisations (Def. F4.7) of the entities (Def. 1c2) 
of the other system (Def. 1b), termed transformational interlock’, or for ‘the 
one sub-system (Def. 1b providing the basic entities (Def. 1c2a) – i.e. the ul-
timate constituents (Def. 7f1b) – of the other sub-system (Def. 1b), termed 
ontological interlock’.  
Comment: A cenology (Def. 2b1a) and a logology (Def. 2a4a), also a delology 
(Def. 2c1a) and a logology (Def. 2a4a), interlock transformationally. A cenol-
ogy (Def. 2b1a) provides the cenos (Def. 2b1) to which correspond the cen-
ological forms (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23) of the allomorphs (Def. 24b1a) which are 
the morphontic (cf. Def. F3h) manifestations (Def. 26o) of expressions (Def. 
24a), corresponding to logos (Def. 2a4). Similarly a delology (Def. 2c1a) pro-
vides the delos (Def. 2c1) to which correspond the delological forms (Def. 
2c1d, Def. 23c) of the allosemes (Def. 24c1a) which are the semantic (cf. Def. 
F4.3) manifestations (Def. 26o) of contents (Def. 24b), corresponding to logos 
(Def. 2a4).  
A logidics (Def. 2a4a2) and a logematics (Def. 2a4b), a cenidics (Def. 
2b1a2) and cenematics (Def. 2b1b), a delidics (Def. 2c1a2) and a delematics 
(Def. 2c1b), a logematics (Def. 2a4b) and a logotactics (Def. 2a4c), a cenemat-
ics (Def. 2b1b) and a cenotactics (Def. 2b1c), a delematics (Def. 2c1b) and a 
delotactics (Def. 2c1c), also a logidics (Def. 2a4a2) and a logidotactics (Def. 
2a4c1), a cenidics (Def. 2b1a2) and a cenidotactics (Def. 2b1c1), and a delidics 
(Def. 2c1a2) and a delidotactics (Def. 2c1c1) interlock ontologically.  
There is also a kind of interlock, similar to ontological interlock, between 
cenotactics (Def. 2b1c) and para-cenotactics (Def. 18c), logotactics (Def. 2a4c) 
and para-logotactics (Def. 19c), and delotactics (Def. 2c1c) and para-delotactics 
(Def. 18i), but this is of a different kind. In these cases the ontotactics (Def. 3b) 
provide the entities (Def. 1c2) that correspond to the base (Def. 20a) of entities 
(Def. 1c2) in para-ontotactics (Def. 19f) (cf. Mulder 1989: 440). 
Def. 4a. ‘Simple system (Def. 1b)’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) without combinations (Def. 
6c) of entities (Def. 1c2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 4a; Mulder 
1989: 440, Def. 4a). 
Def. 4b. ‘Complex system (Def. 1b)’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) with combinations (Def. 
6c) of entities (Def. 1c2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 4b; Mulder 
1989: 440, Def.4b). 
Def. 4b1. ‘Unordered system (Def. 1b)’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) without ordering rela-
tions (Def. 6a) between entities (Def. 1c2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
44, Def. 4b1; Mulder 1989: 440, Def. 4b1). 
Comment: This may be an ontomics (Def. 3a1a1), an ontidics (Def. 3a1a2), or 
an ontematics (Def. 3a1b). 
Def. 4b2. ‘Ordered system (Def. 1b)’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) with ordering relations 
(Def. 6a) between entities (Def. 1c2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, 
Def. 4b2; Mulder 1989: 440, Def.4b2). 
Def. 5. ‘Semiotic system’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) constituted by the transformational 
interlock (Def. 3c2a) of one logology (Def. 2a4a) with one cenology (Def. 
2b1a) and one delology (Def. 2c1a)’. Alternative definition to Def. 1c (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 5; Mulder 1989: 440, Def. 5). 
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Comment: “Definitions 3b–5 are specially geared to clarifying the notion proper 
language. All natural languages are proper languages, but there is at least a 
theoretical possibility that the reverse does not hold” (Mulder 1989: 440). 
Def. 5a. ‘Compound semiotic system’ for ‘semiotic system (Def. 1c, Def. 5) that is 
itself a system (Def. 1b) of ontologically interlocking (Def. 3c2a) systems 
(Def. 1b)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 83-84). 
Comment: Compound semiotic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5), as defined here, in-
volve interlock (cf. Def. 3c2a) between different levels within the system ontol-
ogy (Def. 3a1a). Thus a cenology (Def. 2b1a) is compound if there is at least ei-
ther a cenematics (Def. 2b1b) or a cenidotactics (Def. 2b1c1) interlocking (Def. 
3c2a) with the basic inventory of elements (this basic inventory being by defini-
tion in this case a cenidics (Def. 2b1a2), and not a cenomics (Def. 2b1a1)). 
Def. 6a. ‘Ordering relations’ for ‘asymmetrical (cf. Def. 11a) relations between enti-
ties (Def. 1c2) in combinations (constructions) (Def. 6c, Def. 7f)’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 6a; Mulder 1989: 440, Def. 6a). 
Def. 6b. ‘Relations of simultaneity’ for ‘symmetrical (cf. Def. 11b, Def. 11c) rela-
tions between entities (Def. 1c2) in combinations (constructions) (Def. 6c, 
cf. Def. 7f)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 6b; Mulder 1989: 440, 
Def. 6b). 
Comment: “By Axiom A, only functional criteria may be brought to bear in de-
ciding whether a relation is symmetrical or not” (Mulder 1989: 440). 
Def. 6c. ‘Construction (cf. Def. 7f)’ or ‘combination’ or ‘complex’ for ‘self-
contained (Def. 1b1) complex of entities (Def. 1c2) in cenology (Def. 2b1a), 
delology (Def. 2c1a) or logology (Def. 2a4a)’ (cf. Mulder 1989: 440, Def. 
6c). 
Comment: The terms imply such notions as: complex ceneme (Def. 8a), ceno-
tagm (Def. 9a), complex para-cenotagm (Def. 18e), complex deleme (Def. 8c), 
delotagm (Def. 9c), complex para-delotagm (Def. 18k), complex logeme (Def. 
8b), logotagm (Def. 9b), complex para-logotagm (Def. 19e), complex sentence 
(Def. 21) (i.e. consisting of more than one clause (Def. 21a) as its immediate 
constituents (Def. 7f1a)), and self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of immediate 
constituents (Def. 7f1a) (cf. Mulder 1989: 440–441). 
Def. 7a. ‘Paradigmatic’ for ‘the oppositional aspect of semiotic entities (Def. 
1c2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 
7a). 
Def. 7a1. ‘Paradigmatic (Def. 7a) relations’ for ‘relations of opposition between 
members of sets’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a1; Mulder 1989: 
441, Def. 7a1). 
Def. 7a2. ‘Commutation’ for ‘alternation (or: choice) between semiotic entities (Def. 
1c3) (or ‘zero’ and semiotic entities (Def. 1c3)) in functional (Def. 1a) op-
position as immediate constituents (Def. 7f1a), in a given context’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a2; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a2). 
Def. 7a3. ‘Distinctive function’ (symbolised: d, for distinctive function in cenology; s, 
for distinctive function in logology; and e, for distinctive function in delol-
ogy) for ‘the set of oppositions in which an entity (Def. 1c2) may par-
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take’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a3; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 
7a3).   
Comment: Distinctive function (d in cenology, s in logology, and e in logology) 
can be expressed symbolically: “In symbols a~(b∪c∪d), which states the dis-
tinctive function of a, in case the set of oppositions a enters into is (a~b, a~c, 
a~d), and no other. In fact, a~(b∪c∪d) = a~b∪a~c∪a~d” (Mulder 1989: 441).  
Def. 7a4. ‘Neutralization’ for ‘suspension of opposition between members of a corre-
lation (Def. 7a4a) in given contexts, and governed by those contexts’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a3; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a4). 
Def. 7a4a. ‘Correlation’ for ‘set of ontotactic (Def. 7c) entities (Def. 1c2, Def. 9d1) 
which have an immediate constituent (Def. 7f1a) in common’ (cf. Mulder 
and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a3; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a4a). 
Def. 7a4b. ‘Archionteme’ for ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) entity (Def. 1c2) resulting from neu-
tralization (Def. 7a4)’. Alternative definition: ‘Simultaneous (cf. Def. 6b) 
bundle of ontids (Def. 8d2) in particular contexts, common to two or more 
ontemes (Def. 8d) in other contexts, i.e. equalling the intersection of those 
ontemes (Def. 8d)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a3; Mulder 
1989: 441, Def. 7a4b). 
Comment: As is predictable from Def. 0a, Def. 0b, and Def. 0c (preliminary 
definitions), the term archionteme allows for the generation of the following 
terms: archilogeme (also, archimoneme, archimorpheme, in natural language: 
archilexeme), archiceneme (in spoken natural language: archiphoneme; in writ-
ten natural language archigrapheme), archideleme. Mulder’s definition (Mulder 
1989: 441, Def. 7a4b) of archi-features (Def. 1c1) in terms of intersection has 
been followed in definition 7a4b. here. However, there is reason to believe that 
a definition of archionteme (etc.) in terms of disjunction might be more globally 
coherent (cf. Dickins 1998: 427–428; Note 21). 
Def. 7b. ‘Syntagmatic’ for ‘the ordering (cf. Def. 6a) aspect of semiotic entities (Def. 
1c3)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7b; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 
7b). 
Def. 7b1. ‘Syntagmatic (Def. 7b) relations’ for ‘ordering relations (Def. 6a) between 
semiotic entities (Def. 1c3) in combinations (constructions) (Def. 6c, Def. 
7f)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7b1; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 
7b1). 
Comment: “Though the term permutation may seem the syntagmatic equivalent 
of ‘commutation’ [Def. 7a2], it is used in a realizational, rather than structural 
sense, though there may be structural implications. I use it as a primitive term, 
i.e. I refrain from defining it” (Mulder 1989: 441). 
Def. 7b2. ‘Syntagmatic (Def. 7b) entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) entity 
(Def. 9d1)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7b2; Mulder 1989: 441, 
Def. 7b2). 
Comment: This implies that it is orderable, and/or has constituents (Def. 7f1) 
that commute (cf. Def. 7a2) with orderable entities (Def. 1c2), provided it is not 
intrinsically uncombinable at the level of ontotactics (Def. 3b), (such as ‘yes’ in 
English, except in conjunctive constructions (Def. 6c) such as ‘yes or no’) 
(adapted from Mulder 1989: 441-442).  
 20
Dickins : Extended Axiomatic Functionalism: Postulates 
Def. 7c. ‘Ontotactic’ for ‘logotactic (cf. Def. 2a4c), cenotactic (cf. Def. 2b1c) or 
delotactic (cf. Def. 2c1c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7c; Mulder 
1989: 442, Def. 7c). 
Def. 7c1. ‘Ontotactic (Def. 7c) relations’ for ‘logotactic relations (Def. 7d1), cenotac-
tic relations (Def. 7e1) or delotactic relations (Def. 7e3)’. Alternative defini-
tion: ‘constructional relations (Def. 7f) (whether ordering (Def. 6a) or not) 
between syntagmatic (Def. 7b) entities (Def. 7b2), as immediate constitu-
ents (Def. 7f1a) in combinations (constructions) (Def. 6c, cf. Def. 7f)’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7c3; Mulder 1989: 442, Def. 7c2). 
Comment: Note that ontotactic (Def. 7c) relations are not necessarily syntag-
matic (Def. 7b) relations (Def. 7b1), although syntagmatic (Def. 7b) relations 
(Def. 7b1) are necessarily ontotactic (Def. 7c) relations. Ontotactic (Def. 7c) re-
lations are relations between syntagmatic (Def. 7b) entities (Def. 7b2) (cf. 
Mulder 1989: 442, Def. 7c2). 
Def. 7d. ‘Logotactic entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) entity (Def. 1c2) in 
logology (Def. 2a4a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: Def. 7d); Mulder 1989: 
442, Def. 7d). 
Def. 7d1. ‘Logotactic relations’ for ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) relations (Def. 7c1) in logol-
ogy (Def. 2a4a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: Def. 7d1); Mulder 1989: 
442, Def. 7e). 
Def. 7e. ‘Cenotactic entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) entity (Def. 1c2) in 
cenology (Def. 2b1a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7c1); Mulder 
1989: 442, Def. 7e1). Alternative definition to Def. 9a2. 
Def. 7e1. ‘Cenotactic relations’ for ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) relations (Def. 7c1) in cenol-
ogy (Def. 2b1a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7e); Mulder 1989: 
442, Def. 7e1). 
Def. 7e2. ‘Delotactic entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) entity (Def. 1c2) in 
delology (Def. 2c1a)’. Alternative definition to Def. 9c1. 
Def. 7e3. ‘Delotactic relations’ for ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) relations (Def. 7c1) in delol-
ogy (Def. 2c1a)’. 
Def. 7f. ‘Constructional relations’ for ‘relations between immediate constituents 
(Def. 7f1a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7f; Mulder 1989: 442, 
Def. 7f). 
Comment: “Definitions 6a–7f lay the foundations for further terminological de-
velopments necessary for an effective description of semiotic systems” (Mulder 
1989: 442). 
Def. 7f1. ‘Constituents’ for ‘entities (Def. 1c2) (of the same kind, i.e. of the same 
level of abstraction) in self-contained (Def. 1b1) combinations (Def. 
6c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7f1; Mulder 1989: 442, Def. 
7f1). 
Def. 7f1a. ‘Immediate constituents’ for ‘constituents (Def. 7f1) that are not constitu-
ents (Def. 7f1) of constituents (Def. 7f1) within the combination (Def. 6c) in 
question’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7f1a; Mulder 1989: 442, 
Def. 7f1a). 
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Def. 7f1b. ‘Ultimate constituents’ for ‘constituents (Def. 7f1) that are basic (or: mini-
mum) entities (Def. 1c2a) at the level in question’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 
1980: 45, Def. 7f1b; Mulder 1989: 442, Def. 7f1b). 
Comment: It is theorematic that in cenematics (Def. 2b1b), logematics (Def. 
2a4b) and delematics (Def. 2c1b), in contradistinction with cenotactics (Def. 
2b1c), logotactics (Def. 2a4c) and delotactics (Def. 2c1c), immediate constitu-
ents (Def. 7f1a) are always at the same time ultimate constituents (adapted from 
Mulder 1989: 442–443). See also: basic entity (Def. 1c2a). 
Def. 7g. ‘Positions’ for ‘divisions within an ontotactic (Def. 7c) construction (Def. 
6c), such that in every such division an entity (Def. 1c2), as an immediate 
constituent (Def. 7f1a), can stand and alternate (i.e. commute: cf. Def. 7a2) 
with other entities (Def. 1c2), or with zero’. Alternative definition: ‘divi-
sions within a construction (Def. 6c) corresponding to immediate constitu-
ents (Def. 7f1a) as relata of ontotactic (Def. 7c) relations (Def. 7c1)’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 46, Def. 7g; Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 7g). 
Def. 7h. ‘Archi-position’ for ‘the intersection of two or more positions (Def. 7g)’ (cf. 
Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 7h). 
Comment: Mulder argues that in phonotactics (Def. Ob, Def. 2b1c), intersection 
can only occur between adjacent positions. In lexotactics (Def. 0a, Def. 2a4c) 
and delotactics (Def. 2c1c), intersection can occur between any two or more pe-
ripheral (cf. Def. 13b) positions (Def. 7g) (cf. Mulder 1989: 443). Mulder’s ap-
proach to the archi-position appears problematic. In order for there to be inter-
section, the sets involved need to have a member (or members) in common. Dif-
ferent positions considered as sets (of one member each) have no members in 
common with one another. Therefore, it is not possible for them to intersect. 
This has led Heselwood (1992: 110) to suggest that neutralization (cf. Def. 7a4) 
be treated not in terms of intersection, but in terms of disjunction (cf. Dickins 
1998: 427–428; Note 21; also comment under Def. 7a4b, relating to the ar-
chionteme). 
Def. 8a. ‘Ceneme’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of one or more cenids (dis-
tinctive features) (Def. 8a2) as its immediate (Def. 7f1a), and at the same 
time ultimate (Def. 7f1b), constituents (Def. 7f1)’. Alternative definitions: 
‘basic (or: minimum) syntagmatic (Def. 7b) entity (Def. 1c2a, Def. 7b2) in 
cenology (Def. 2b1a)’, ‘basic (or: minimum) cenotactic (cf. Def. 2b1c) en-
tity (Def. 1c2a, Def. 7e, Def. 9a2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 46, Def. 
8a; Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8a). 
Def. 8a1. ‘Cenematic (cf. Def. 2b1b) complex (cf.Def. 6c)’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) 
ceneme (Def. 8a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 46, Def. 8a1; Mulder 1989: 
443, Def. 8a1). 
Comment: A complex (cf. Def. 6c) ceneme (Def. 8a) is a cenematic (cf. Def. 
2b1b) complex (Def. 6c), as opposed to a cenotactic (cf. Def. 2b1c) complex 
(Def. 6c). A complex (cf. Def. 6c) ceno (Def. 2b1) is either cenematically (cf. 
Def. 2b1b) complex (Def. 6c) or cenotactically (cf. Def. 2b1c) complex (Def. 
6c), or para-cenotactically (cf. Def. 18c) complex (Def. 6c) (adapted from 
Mulder 1989: 443). 
Def. 8a2. ‘Cenid’ or ‘distinctive feature’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in cenidics (Def. 
2b1a2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 46, Def. 8a3; Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 
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8a2). Alternative definitions: ‘Basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in 
cenematics (Def. 2b1b)’, ‘basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in cenido-
tactics (Def. 2b1c1)’.  
Comment: Since cenidics (Def. 2b1a2) is a simple system (Def. 1b), the cenid 
(distinctive feature) is not only the unit (Def. 9e) in cenidics (Def. 2b1a2), but is 
also the basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in cenidics (Def. 2b1a2). I have 
avoided using a definition of the cenid along these lines (although it accords 
with the form of the definitions given by Mulder (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 46, 
Def. 8a3; Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8a2), since the presentation of the cenid as the 
basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in both cenidics (Def. 2b1a2), cenemat-
ics (Def. 2b1b), and cenidotactics (Def. 2b1c1) suggests a greater similarity be-
tween these two levels than they in fact possess. 
Def. 8a3. ‘Hypercenid’ or ‘hyperfeature’ for ‘cenid (distinctive feature) (Def. 8a2) in 
a particular cenematic (cf. Def. 2b1b) context, equivalent to two or more ce-
nids (distinctive features) (Def. 8a2) in at least one other cenematic (cf. Def. 
2b1b) context’ (cf. Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8a3). 
Def. 8a4. ‘Hyperceneme’ for ‘ceneme (Def. 8a) consisting of, or containing, one or 
more hypercenids (hyper-features) (Def. 8a3)’ (cf. Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 
8a4). 
Def. 8a5. ‘Cenome’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in cenomics (Def. 2b1a1)’.  
Comment: Since cenomics (Def. 2b1a1) is a simple system (Def. 4a) ontology 
(Def. 3a1a) the cenome is not only the unit (Def. 9e) in cenomics (Def. 2b1a1), 
it is also the basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a). 
Def. 8b. ‘Logeme’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) (by definition: simultaneous; cf. 
Def. 6b) bundle of one or more logids (monemes) (Def. 8b2) as its immedi-
ate (Def. 7f1a), and at the same time ultimate (Def. 7f1b), constituents (Def. 
7f1)’. Alternative definitions: ‘basic (or: minimum) syntagmatic (Def. 7b) 
entity (Def. 1c2a, Def. 7b2) in logology (Def. 2a4a)’, ‘basic (or: minimum) 
entity (Def. 1c2a) in logotactics (Def. 2a4c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
47, Def. 8b; Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8b). 
Def. 8b1. ‘Logematic (cf. Def. 2a4b) complex (Def. 6c)’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) 
logeme (Def. 8b)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 8b2; Mulder 1989: 
444, Def. 8b1). 
Comment: A complex (cf. Def. 6c) logeme (Def. 8b) is a logematic (cf. Def. 
2a4b) complex (Def. 6c), as opposed to a logotactic (cf. Def. 2a4c) complex 
(Def. 6c). A complex (cf. Def. 6c) logo (Def. 2a4) is either logematically (cf. 
Def. 2a4b) complex (Def. 6c) or logotactically (cf. Def. 2a4c) complex (Def. 
6c), or para-logotactically (cf. Def. 19c) complex (Def. 6c), i.e. it consists of 
more than one clause (Def. 21a) (adapted from Mulder 1989: 444, Def. 8b1). 
Def. 8b2. ‘Logid’ or ‘moneme’ or ‘morpheme’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in logidics (Def. 
2a4a2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 8b3; Mulder 1989: 444, Def. 
8b2). Alternative definition: ‘Basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in 
logematics (Def. 2a4b)’, ‘basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in logido-
tactics (Def. 2a4c1)’. 
Comment: Since logidics (Def. 2a4a2) is a simple system (Def. 1b), the logid 
(moneme, morpheme) is not only the unit (Def. 9e) in logidics (Def. 2a4a2), but 
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is also the basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in logidics (Def. 2a4a2). See 
comment under cenid (Def. 8b2). 
Def. 8b3. ‘Hyperlogid’, or ‘hyper-moneme’, or ‘hypermorpheme’ for ‘logid 
moneme, morpheme) (Def. 8b2) in a particular logematic (cf. Def. 2a4b) 
context, equivalent to two or more logids (monemes, morphemes) (Def. 
8b2) in at least one other logematic (cf. Def. 2a4b) context’. 
Def. 8b4. ‘Hyperlogeme’ for ‘logeme (Def. 8b) consisting of, or containing, one or 
more hyperlogids (hyper-monemes) (Def. 8b3)’. 
Def. 8b5. ‘Logome’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in logomics (Def. 2a4a1)’.  
Comment: Since logomics (Def. 2a4a1) is a simple system (Def. 4a) ontology 
(Def. 3a1a) the logome is not only the unit (Def. 9e) in logomics (Def. 2a4a1), it 
is also the basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a). 
Def. 8c. ‘Deleme’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) (by definition: simultaneous; cf. 
Def. 6b) bundle of one or more delids (Def. 8c2) as its immediate (Def. 
7f1a), and at the same time ultimate (Def. 7f1b), constituents (Def. 7f1)’. 
Alternative definitions: ‘basic (or: minimum) syntagmatic (Def. 7b) entity 
(Def. 1c2a, Def. 7b2) in delology (Def. 2c1a)’, ‘basic (or: minimum) delo-
tactic (cf. Def. 2c1c) entity (Def. 1c2a, Def. 7e, Def. 9c1)’. 
Def. 8c1. ‘Delematic (cf. Def. 2c1b) complex (Def. 6c)’ for ‘complex (cf. Def. 6c) 
deleme (Def. 8c)’.  
Comment: A complex (cf. Def. 6c) deleme (Def. 8c) is a delematic (cf. Def. 
2c1b) complex (Def. 6c), as opposed to a delotactic (cf. Def. 2c1c) complex 
(Def. 6c). A complex (cf. Def. 6c) delo (Def. 2c1) is either delematically (cf. 
Def. 2c1b) complex (Def. 6c) or delotactically (cf. Def. 2c1c) complex (Def. 
6c), or para-delotactically (cf. Def. 18i) complex (Def. 6c). 
Def. 8c2. ‘Delid’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in delidics (Def. 2c1a2)’. Alternative definition: 
‘Basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in delematics (Def. 2c1b)’, ‘basic 
(or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in delidotactics (Def. 2c1c1)’.  
Comment: Since delidics (Def. 2c1a2) is a simple system (Def. 4a), the delid is 
not only the unit (Def. 9e) in delidics (Def. 2c1a2), but is also the basic (or: 
minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a) in delidics (Def. 2c1a2). See comment under ‘ce-
nid’ (Def. 8b2). 
Def. 8c3. ‘Hyperdelid’ for ‘delid (Def. 8c2) in a particular delematic (cf. Def. 2c1b) 
context, equivalent to two or more delids (Def. 8c2) in at least one other 
delematic (cf. Def. 2c1b) context’. 
Def. 8c4. ‘Hyperdeleme’ for ‘deleme (Def. 8c) consisting of, or containing, one or 
more hyperdelids (Def. 8a3)’. 
Def. 8c5. ‘Delome’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in delomics (Def. 2c1a1)’.  
Comment: Since delomics (Def. 2c1a1) is a simple system (Def. 4a) ontology 
(Def. 3a1a) the delome is not only the unit (Def. 9e) in delomics (Def. 2c1a1), it 
is also the basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a). 
Def. 8d. ‘Onteme’ for ‘ceneme (Def. 8a), logeme (Def. 8b), or deleme (Def. 8c)’. 
Def. 8d1. ‘Ontematic (cf. Def. 3a1b) complex (Def. 6c)’ for ‘cenematic (cf. Def. 
2b1b) complex (cf. Def. 8a1), logematic (cf. Def. 2a4b) complex (cf. Def. 
8b1), or delematic (cf. Def. 2c1b) complex (Def. 8c1)’. 
Def. 8d2. ‘Ontid’ for ‘cenid (Def. 8a2), logid (Def. 8b2), or delid (Def. 8c2)’. 
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Def. 8d3. ‘Hyperontid’ for ‘hypercenid (Def. 8a3), hyperlogid (‘hypermoneme’, ‘hy-
permorpheme’ (Def. 8b3), or hyperdelid (Def. 8c3)’. 
Def. 8d4. ‘Hyperonteme’ for ‘hyperceneme (Def. 8a4), hyperlogeme (Def. 8b4), or 
hyperdeleme (Def. 8c4)’. 
Def. 8d5. ‘Ontome’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in ontomics (Def. 3a1a1)’.  
Comment: Since ontomics (Def. 3a1a1) is a simple system (Def. 4a) ontology 
(Def. 3a1a1) the ontome is not only the unit (Def. 9e) in ontomics (Def. 3a1a1), 
it is also the basic (or: minimum) entity (Def. 1c2a). 
Def. 9a. ‘Cenotagm’ or ‘distributional unit’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of 
positions (Def. 7g) in cenotactics (Def. 2b1c)’, or for ‘instance of a self-
contained bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in cenotactics (Def. 2b1c)’. Alterna-
tive definition for ‘distributional unit’ in the former, i.e. abstract, sense: 
‘minimum type of structure within which the distribution (Def. 9a1) of 
cenotactic (cf. Def. 2b1c) entities (Def. 7e, Def. 9a2) can be described com-
pletely and exhaustively’. Alternative definition for cenotagm, in the second 
sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in cenotactics (Def. 2b1c)’. Alternative definition for 
cenotagm allied to the second sense, ‘base (Def. 20a) in para-cenotactics 
(Def. 18c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 9, Def. 9a; Mulder 1989: 
444, Def. 9a). 
Comment: “That is to say that nothing outside such a structure can determine 
the distribution [Def. 9a1] of immediate constituent [Def. 7f1a] entities [Def. 
1c2] within the structure. It is possible that we may in some cases have to de-
scribe further the distribution of types of distributional unit with respect to one 
another. In fact, I tend to use the term ‘distributional unit’ in the more abstract 
sense, and the term ‘cenotagm’ (phonotagm) or an instance of a distributional 
unit” (Mulder 1989: 444). 
Def. 9a0a. ‘Cenidotagm’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in 
cenidotactics (Def. 2b1c1)’, or for ‘instance of self-contained (Def. 1b1) 
bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in cenidotactics (Def. 2b1c1)’. Alternative 
definition for cenidotagm, in the second sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in cenidotac-
tics (Def. 2b1c1)’. Alternative definition allied to second sense, ‘base (Def. 
20a) in para-cenotactics (Def. 18c) in the case of a compound (cf. Def. 5a) 
cenology (Def. 2b1a) which does not contain a cenematics (Def. 2b1b) but 
does contain a para-cenotactics (Def. 18c)’. 
Def. 9a0b. ‘Cenemotagm’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of positions (Def. 7g) 
in cenemotactics (Def. 2b1c2)’ or for ‘instance of self-contained (Def. 1b1) 
bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in cenemotactics (Def. 2b1c2)’. Alternative 
definition for cenemotagm, in the second sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in cenemo-
tactics (Def. 2b1c2)’. Alternative definition allied to second sense, ‘base 
(Def. 20a) in para-cenotactics (Def. 18c) in the case of a compound (cf. Def. 
5a) cenology (Def. 2b1a) which contains a cenematics (Def. 2b1b) and a 
para-cenotactics (Def. 18c)’. 
Def. 9a0c. ‘Cenotheme’ for ‘in cenotactics (Def. 2b1c) self-contained (Def. 1b1) (by 
definition: simultaneous; cf. Def. 6b) bundle of two or more cenos (Def. 
2b1) as its immediate constituents (Def. 7f1a)’. 
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Def. 9a1. ‘Distribution’ for ‘the set of occurrences of an entity (Def. 1c2) in construc-
tional relations (Def. 7f) with other entities (Def. 1c2) as immediate con-
stituents (Def. 7f1a) in the same construction (Def. 6c)’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 9a1; Mulder 1989: 444, Def. 9a1). 
Def. 9a2. ‘Cenotactic (cf. Def. 2b1c) entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘ceneme (Def. 8a) or ceno-
tagm (Def. 9a)’ (cf. Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 9b1). Alternative definition to 
Def. 7e. 
Def. 9b. ‘Logotagm’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in 
logotactics (Def. 2a4c)’, or for ‘instance of a self-contained bundle of posi-
tions (Def. 7g) in logotactics (Def. 2a4c). Alternative definition for ‘logo-
tagm’ in the first sense ‘underlying structure (Def. 14c) of a self-contained 
(Def. 1b1) bundle of logotactic entities (Def. 7d, Def. 9b1)’. Alternative 
definitions for logotagm in the second sense ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bun-
dle of logotactic entities (Def. 7d, Def. 9b1), as immediate constituents 
(Def. 7f1a)’, or ‘logotactic complex (Def. 6c)’. Alternative definition for lo-
gotagm, in the second sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in logotactics (Def. 2a4c)’. Al-
ternative definition for logotagm allied to second sense, ‘base (Def. 20a) in 
para-logotactics (Def. 19c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 9b; 
Mulder 1989: 444, Def. 9b). 
Def. 9b0a. ‘Logidotagm’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in 
logidotactics (Def. 2a4c1)’, or for ‘instance of self-contained (Def. 1b1) 
bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in logidotactics (Def. 2a4c1)’. Alternative 
definition for logidotagm, in the second sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in logidotac-
tics (Def. 2a4c1)’. Alternative definition allied to second sense, ‘base (Def. 
20a) in para-logotactics (Def. 19c) in the case of a compound (cf. Def. 5a) 
logology (Def. 2a4a) which does not contain a logematics (Def. 2a4c2) but 
does contain a para-logotactics (Def. 19c)’. 
Def. 9b0b. ‘Logemotagm’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of positions (Def. 7g) 
in logemotactics (Def. 2a4c2)’, or for ‘instance of self-contained (Def. 1b1) 
bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in logemotactics (Def. 2a4c2)’. Alternative 
definition for logemotagm, in the second sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in logemo-
tactics (Def. 2a4c2)’. Alternative definition allied to second sense, ‘base 
(Def. 20a) in para-logotactics (Def. 19c) in the case of a compound (cf. Def. 
5a) logology (Def. 2a4a) which contains a logematics (Def. 2a4b) and a 
para-logotactics (Def. 19c)’. 
Def. 9b0c. ‘Logotheme’ for ‘in logotactics (Def. 2a4c) self-contained (Def. 1b1) (by 
definition: simultaneous; cf. Def. 6b) bundle of two or more logos (Def. 
2a4) as its immediate constituents (Def. 7f1a)’. 
Def. 9b1. ‘Logotactic (cf. Def. 2a4c) entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘logeme (Def. 8b), or logo-
tagm (Def. 9b)’ (cf. Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 9b1). Alternative definition to 
Def. 7d. 
Def. 9c. ‘Delotagm’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in 
delotactics (Def. 2c1c)’, or for ‘instance of a self-contained bundle of posi-
tions (Def. 7g) in delotactics (Def. 2c1c)’. Alternative definition for delo-
tagm, in the second sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in delotactics (Def. 2c1c)’. Alter-
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native definition allied to second sense, ‘base (Def. 20a) in para-delotactics 
(Def. 18i)’. 
Def. 9c0a. ‘Delidotagm’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in 
delidotactics (Def. 2c1c1)’, or for ‘instance of self-contained (Def. 1b1) 
bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in delidotactics (Def. 2c1c1)’. Alternative 
definition for delidotagm, in second sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in delidotactics 
(Def. 2c1c1)’. Alternative definition allied to second sense, ‘base (Def. 20a) 
in para-delotactics (Def. 18i) in the case of a compound (cf. Def. 5a) delol-
ogy (Def. 2c1a) which does not contain a delematics (Def. 2c1b) but does 
contain a para-delotactics (Def. 18i)’. 
Def. 9c0b. ‘Delemotagm’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 1b1) bundle of positions (Def. 7g) 
in delematics (Def. 2c1b)’, or for ‘instance of self-contained (Def. 1b1) 
bundle of positions (Def. 7g) in delemotactics (Def. 2c1c2)’. Alternative 
definition for delemotagm, in second sense, ‘unit (Def. 9e) in delemotactics 
(Def. 2c1c2)’. Alternative definition allied to second sense, ‘base (Def. 20a) 
in para-delotactics (Def. 18i) in the case of a compound (cf. Def. 5a) delol-
ogy (Def. 2c1a) which contains a delematics (Def. 2c1b) and a para-
delotactics (Def. 18i)’. 
Def. 9c0c. ‘Delotheme’ for ‘in delotactics (Def. 2c1c) self-contained (Def. 1b1) (by 
definition: simultaneous; cf. Def. 6b) bundle of two or more delos (Def. 
2c1) as its immediate constituents (Def. 7f1a)’. 
Def. 9c1. ‘Delotactic (cf. Def. 2c1c) entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘deleme (Def. 8c) or delo-
tagm (Def. 9c)’. Alternative definition to Def. 7e2. 
Def. 9d. ‘Ontotagm’ for ‘cenotagm (Def. 9a), logotagm (Def. 9b), or delotagm (Def. 
9c)’. 
Def. 9d0a. ‘Ontidotagm’ for ‘cenidotagm (Def. 9a0a), logidotagm (Def. 9b0a), or deli-
dotagm (Def. 9c0a)’.  
Def. 9d0b. ‘Ontemotagm’ for ‘cenemotagm (Def. 9a0b), logemotagm (Def. 9b0b), or 
delemotagm (Def. 9c0b)’.  
Def. 9d0c. ‘Ontotheme’ for ‘cenotheme (Def. 9a0c), logotheme (Def. 9b0c), or 
delotheme (Def. 9c0c). 
Comment: cf. Dickins 1998: 138–150. 
Def. 9d1. ‘Ontotactic (Def. 7c) entities (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘cenotactic entities (Def. 7e, 
Def. 9a2), logotactic entities (Def. 7d1, Def. 9b1), or delotactic entities 
(Def. 7e2, Def. 9c1)’ or for ‘ontemes (Def. 8d) or ontotagms (Def. 9d)’.  
Def. 9e. ‘Unit’ for ‘onto (Def. 3a1) in a particular non-compound (cf. Def. 5a) semi-
otic system (Def. 1c, Def. 5) which constitutes a self-contained (Def. 1b1) 
set or combination (Def. 6c) in that semiotic system (Def. 1c, Def. 5)’.  
Def. 10. ‘Syntagmeme’ for ‘paradigmeme (Def. 10a) in a particular position (Def. 
7g) and in its capacity of standing in that position (Def. 7g)’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 48, Def. 10; Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 10).  
Def. 10a. ‘Paradigmeme’ for ‘member of a self-contained (Def. 1b1) set of entities 
(Def. 1c2) in functional (Def. 1a) opposition in a given context’. Alternative 
definition: ‘member of a paradigm (Def. 10b)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 
1980: 48, Def. 10a; Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 10a).  
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Def. 10b. ‘Paradigm’ for ‘set of entities (Def. 1c2) in functional (Def. 1a) opposition 
in a given context’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 46, Def. 7g1); Mulder 
1989: 445, Def. 10b). 
Comment: Definitions 7–10b refer to general notions in the description of semi-
otic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5). Definitions 8a-8a4, 9a–9a0b, and 9b2 are specifi-
cally relevant to cenology (Def. 2b1a). Definitions 8b-8b4 and 9b–9b1 are spe-
cifically relevant to logology (Def. 2a4a). Definitions 8c–8c4 and 9c–9c1 are 
specifically relevant to delology (Def. 2c1a). Definitions 8d–8d4 and 9d–9e are 
general statements. 
Def. 11a. ‘Relation of sub-ordination (or: determination)’ for ‘direct ontotactic (Def. 
7c) asymmetrical (cf. Def. 6a) relation (Def. 15) of functional (Def. 1a) de-
pendency’ (cf. Def. 1b1, Def. 6a, Def. 11b, Def. 11c). Alternative definition: 
‘direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) relation (Def. 15) of unilateral functional (Def. 
1a) dependency (cf. Def. 1b1, Def. 6a, Def. 11b, Def. 11c)’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 48, Def. 11a); Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 11a). 
Comment: The converse of sub-ordination is super-ordination (or: government). 
If a and b are in direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) relation (Def. 15), and a is for its 
function dependent on b, but not vice versa (in symbols a→b), a is said to be 
sub-ordinate to b, and b super-ordinate to a. Furthermore, a is said to be stand-
ing in peripheral (cf. Def. 13b) and b in nuclear (cf. Def. 13a) position (Def. 7g) 
in the construction (Def. 6c) in question. Super-ordination (or: government) and 
the notions nuclear (cf. Def. 13a) and peripheral (cf. Def. 13b) are hereby de-
fined as well (adapted from Mulder 1989: 445). 
Def. 11b. ‘Relation of coordination’ for ‘direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) (by implication: 
symmetrical (cf. Def. 6a, Def. 11c) relation (Def. 15) of mutual functional 
(Def. 1a) independency (cf. Def. 1b1, Def. 6a, Def. 11a, Def. 11c)’. Alterna-
tive definition: ‘direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) relation (Def.15) of bilateral 
functional (Def. 1a) independency (cf. Def. 1b1, Def. 6a, Def. 11a, Def. 
11c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 48, Def. 11b); Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 
11b). 
Comment: If a and b are in direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) relation (Def. 15), and a is 
for its ontotactic (Def. 7c) function independent of b, and vice versa, a and b are 
said to be coordinated (in symbols: a←/→b) (adapted from Mulder 1989: 445–
446). 
Def. 11c. ‘Relation of interordination’ for ‘direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) (by implication: 
symmetrical (cf. Def. 6a, Def. 11b) relation (Def. 15) of mutual functional 
(Def. 1a) dependency (cf. Def. 1b1, Def. 6a, Def. 11a, Def. 11b)’. Alterna-
tive definition: ‘direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) relation (Def. 15) of bilateral 
functional (Def. 1a) dependency (cf. Def. 1b1, Def. 6a, Def. 11a, Def. 
11b)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 49, Def. 11c); Mulder 1989: 446, Def. 
11c). 
Comment: If a and b are in direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) relation (Def. 15), and a is 
for its ontotactic (Def. 7c) function dependent on b, as well as vice versa, a and 
b are said to be inter-ordinated (in symbols: a↔b) (adapted from Mulder 1989: 
446). 
Def. 12a. ‘Relation of unilateral occurrence dependency’ for ‘relation such that one of 
two entities (Def. 1c2) in direct relation (Def. 15) which are immediate con-
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stituents (Def. 7f1a) in a construction (Def. 6c) can occur in the construction 
(Def. 6c) in question, whilst the other is zero’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
49, Def. 12b); Mulder 1989: 446, Def. 12a). 
Comment: “In symbols [a]b or a[b], the square brackets indicating the occur-
rence-dependent entity [Def. 1c2], i.e. in the above case it requires the other 
item, or an item in the same position [Def. 7g], for its occurrence, but not vice 
versa. The dependent item is called an ‘expansion’ [Def. 13c]” (Mulder 1989: 
446). 
Def. 12b. ‘Bilateral occurrence independency’ for ‘relation such that either of two en-
tities (Def. 1c2) in direct relation (Def. 15) which are immediate constitu-
ents (Def. 7f1a) in a construction (Def. 6c) can occur in the construction 
(Def. 6c) while the other is zero’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 
12c); Mulder 1989: 446, Def. 12b).   
Comment: “In symbols [a][b]. Both items are ‘expansions’ [Def. 13c] in respect 
of one another” (Mulder 1989: 446). 
Def. 12c. ‘Bilateral occurrence interdependency’ for ‘relation such that neither of two 
entities (Def. 1c2) in direct relation (Def. 15) which are immediate constitu-
ents (Def. 7f1a) in a construction (Def. 6c) can occur in the construction 
(Def. 6c) in question, whilst the other is zero’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
49, Def. 12a); Mulder 1989: 446, Def. 12c). 
Comment: “In symbols ab. Neither of the items are ‘expansions’ [Def. 13c] in 
respect of one another” (Mulder 1989: 446). 
Def. 13a. ‘Nucleus’ or ‘governing entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘in a relation of sub-
ordination (Def. 11a) the identity element for the ontotactic (Def. 7c) func-
tions of the elements’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 13a); Mulder 
1989: 446, Def. 13a). 
Comment: In symbols: b→a, [b]→a, a←b, or a←[b], in which a is the nucleus. 
That is, the ontotactic (Def. 7c) relations (Def. 7c1) of the other immediate con-
stituents (Def. 7f1a) depend for their ontotactic (Def. 7c) function on their rela-
tion with the nucleus (adapted from Mulder 1989: 446). 
Def. 13b. ‘Peripheral entity (Def. 1c2)’ or ‘governed entity (Def. 1c2)’ or ‘determi-
nant entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘in a relation of sub-ordination (Def. 11a), a non-
nuclear (cf. Def. 13a) immediate constituent (Def. 7f1a)’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 13b); Mulder 1989: 447, Def. 13b). 
Comment: In symbols: b in the representations for Def. 11a, and Def. 13a 
(adapted from Mulder 1989: 447). 
Def. 13c. ‘Expansion’ for ‘immediate constituent (Def. 7f1a) that commutes (cf. Def. 
7a2) with zero’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 13c; Mulder 1989: 
447, Def. 13c).   
Comment: In symbols a→[b], i.e. sub-ordination (cf. Def. 11a, Def. 13a), in 
which a is an expansion; also [a]←/→[b], i.e. coordination (cf. Def. 11b), in 
which both a and b are expansions. The term ‘expansion’ is always used with 
reference to another entity (Def. 1c2) with which the other entity (Def. 1c2) is 
in direct ontotactic (Def. 7c) relation (Def. 15). Complex (cf. Def. 6c) expan-
sions may contain entities (Def. 1c2) that are themselves not expansions, e.g. 
[[a]→b]→c, or even [a→b]→c (adapted from Mulder 1989: 447).  
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In both the earlier version of the postulates (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 50–
51) and the revised version (Mulder 1989: 447-448) a distinction is made be-
tween diverse determination (Def. 14a; cf. also Def. 11a) and parallel determi-
nation (Def. 14b; cf. also Def. 11a). It seems that this distinction cannot be co-
herently applied (cf. Heselwood 1995; also Dickins 1998: 138–150). It is there-
fore excluded from these postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism along 
with the corresponding definition numbers. 
Def. 14c. ‘Underlying structure’ for ‘abstract representation of an ontotactic (Def. 7c) 
complex (Def. 6c) in terms of positions (Def. 7g), with or without indication 
of occurrence dependency (cf. Def. 12a, Def. 12b, Def. 12c)’ (cf. Mulder 
and Hervey 1980: 51, Def. 14c); Mulder 1989: 448, Def. 14c).  
Def. 15. ‘Direct relation’ for ‘relation between constituents (Def. 7f1) (not necessar-
ily immediate constituents (Def. 7f1a)) that is not a relation via other con-
stituents (Def. 7f1)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 51, Def. 15; Mulder 
1989: 448, Def. 15).  
Def. 16a. ‘Conflation’ for ‘a single realisation (Def. F4.7) corresponding to more than 
one constituent (Def. 7f1) (not immediate constituents (Def. 7f1a)) having a 
similar ontotactic (Def. 7c) function, in a construction (Def. 6c)’ (cf. Mulder 
1989: 448, Def. 16a). 
Comment: “Example: ‘John likes but I hate him’, where ‘hate’ functions in two 
different but equivalent positions [Def. 7g]. Representation: ‘John likes │him│ 
but I hate him’. ... The unshaded box around ‘him’ indicates that there is confla-
tion at that point” (Mulder 1989: 448). As Mulder also notes (1989: 448), in the 
earlier version of the postulates, conflation was termed ellipsis (Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 57, Def. 21). I suspect that the attempt to treat ellipsis, of any 
type, as a structural matter may be ill-conceived (cf. Dickins 1998: 343–348). 
Def. 16b. ‘Functional (Def. 1a) amalgamation’ for ‘one single entity (Def. 1c2) having 
different ontotactic (Def. 7c) functions (and therefore corresponding to more 
than one constituent (Def. 7f1)) on different level of the analysis’ (cf. 
Mulder 1989: 448, Def. 16b). 
Comment: “In phonology [Def. 0b, Def. 2b1a] an example is a single phoneme 
[Def. 8a] standing in a ‘final’ position [Def. 7g] in one phonotagm [Def. 9a], 
but in an initial position [Def. 7g] in another phonotagm [Def. 9a]” (Mulder 
1989: 448). 
Def. 16c. ‘Antecedence’ or ‘post-cedence’ for ‘a case in which an ontotagm (Def. 9d) 
from the structural (but not the realisational (cf. Def. F4.7)) point of view is 
only partly well-formed, but the “missing” entity (Def. 1c2) is represented 
elsewhere’ (cf. Mulder 1989: 448, Def. 16c). 
Comment: Mulder (1989: 449) provides further discussion of the notions of an-
tecedence and postcedence. It seems possible, that as with ellipsis, these notions 
will not be required in the extended version.  
Definitions 11a to 16c in the standard version further develop the whole of 
syntax (plerotactics). The relevant notions are presented and the methodology is 
developed in some detail (cf. Mulder 1989: 449). As has been noted, the appli-
cability of some of these notions to the extended version may be doubted. It also 
remains to be seen whether the notions presented in these definitions are equally 
applicable to logotactics (Def. 2a4c) and to delotactics (Def. 2c1c).  
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Axiom C. Ontos (Def. Def. 3a1) may have para-ontotactic features (Def. 17), i.e. cenos 
(Def. 2b1) may have para-cenotactic features (Def. 18), delos (Def. 2c1) 
may have para-delotactic features (Def. 18f), and logos (Def. 2a4) may have 
para-logotactic features (Def. 19) (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 52, Axiom 
C; Mulder 1989: 449, Axiom C).   
Comment: Axiom C and related definitions deal with the para-ontotactics (Def. 
19f), i.e. principally with para-cenotactic features (Def. 18), para-logotactic fea-
tures (Def. 19) and para-delotactic features (Def. 18f). To para-cenotactic fea-
tures (Def. 18) in natural language (i.e. para-phonotactics features) belong fea-
tures (Def. 1c1) such as tone (cf. Def. 18b), and accent and juncture. To para-
logotactic features (Def. 19) in natural language (i.e. para-lexotactic features) 
belong features (Def. 1c1) such as intonation (cf. Def. 19a) (adapted from 
Mulder 1989: 452). 
Def. 17. ‘Para-ontotactic features’ for ‘para-cenotactic (cf. Def. 18c) features (Def. 
18), para-logotactic (cf. Def. 19c) features (Def. 19), or para-delotactic (cf. 
Def. 18i) features (Def. 18f)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 52, Def. 16; 
Mulder 1989: 449, Def. 17). Alternative definition: ‘features (Def. 1c1) in 
para-ontotactics (Def. 19f)’.  
Comment: cf. Mulder (1989: 450–451) on an extended discussion of corre-
sponding notions in standard axiomatic functionalism. 
Def. 18. ‘Para-cenotactic features’ for ‘features (Def. 1c1) corresponding to cen-
ological form (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23), accompanying, but not determining the 
identity of cenotactic entities (Def. 7e, Def. 9a2)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 
1980: 53, Def. 17; Mulder 1989: 451, Def. 18). 
Comment: A cenotactic entity (Def. 7e, Def. 9a2) in combination (Def. 6c) with 
para-cenotactic features assumes an identity of its own at the level of para-
cenotactics (Def. 18c) (adapted from Mulder 1989: 451). 
Def. 18a. ‘Contrastive para-cenotactic features’ for ‘para-cenotactic features (Def. 18) 
with the function of groupment over and above cenotactic (cf. Def. 2b1c) 
groupment’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 53, Def. 17a; Mulder 1989: 451, 
Def. 18a). 
Comment: One should not be misled by the terminology into thinking that con-
trastive para-ontotactic features (Def. 17) are not functional (Def. 1a). They are, 
as so many other things, e.g. logotactic relations (Def. 7d1), distinctive (cf. Def. 
7a3) in a systemic (cf. Def. 1b), not in a directly oppositional sense (adapted 
from Mulder 1989: 451). 
Def. 18b. ‘Distinctive (cf. Def. 7a3) para-cenotactic features’ for ‘para-cenotactic fea-
tures (Def. 18) that are in a relation of direct opposition with one or more 
other para-cenotactic features (Def. 18), or with zero’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 53, Def. 17b; Mulder 1989: 451, Def. 18b). Alternative defi-
nition: ‘features (Def. 1c1) in para-cenotactics (Def. 18c)’.  
Comment: “A typical example is distinctive ‘tone’, as, for instance, in Chinese. 
Trivially, unless there is no one-one correspondence (in which case it would not 
be trivial), also the phonological [cf. Def. 0b] forms [Def. 2b1d, Def. 23] of dis-
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tinctive intonations are distinctive para-cenotactic (para-phonotactic) features” 
(Mulder 1989: 451). 
Def. 18c. ‘Para-cenotactics’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) of para-cenotactic entities (Def. 
18d)’.  
Def. 18d. ‘Para-cenotactic entity’ for ‘ceno (Def. 2b1) over and above the level of 
cenotactics (Def. 2b1c)’. Alternative definition, ‘entity in para-cenotactics 
(Def. 18c).  
Def. 18e. ‘Para-cenotagm’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in para-cenotactics (Def. 18c)’.  
Def. 18f. ‘Para-delotactic features’ for ‘features (Def. 1c1) corresponding to delologi-
cal form (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c), accompanying, but not determining the iden-
tity of delotactic entities (Def. 7e2, Def. 9c1)’. Alternative definition: ‘Fea-
tures (Def. 1c1) in para-delotactics (Def. 18i)’.  
Def. 18g. ‘Contrastive para-delotactic features’ for ‘para-delotactic features (Def. 18f) 
with the function of groupment over and above delotactic (cf. Def. 2c1c) 
groupment’.  
Def. 18h. ‘Distinctive (cf. Def. 7a3) para-delotactic features’ for ‘para-delotactic fea-
tures (Def. 18f) that are in a relation of direct opposition with one or more 
other para-delotactic features (Def. 18f), or with zero’.  
Def. 18i. ‘Para-delotactics’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) of para-delotactic entities (Def. 
18j)’.  
Def. 18j. ‘Para-delotactic entity’ for ‘delo (Def. 2c1) over and above the level of delo-
tactics (Def. 2c1c)’. Alternative definition: ‘entity in a para-delotactics (Def. 
18i)’.  
Def. 18k. ‘Para-delotagm’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in para-delotactics (Def. 18i)’.  
Def. 19. ‘Para-logotactic features’ for ‘features (Def. 1c1) accompanying, but not 
determining the identity of, logotactic entities (Def. 7d, Def. 9b1) or con-
glomerations of logotactic entities (Def. 7d, Def. 9b1; cf. Def. 21, Def. 
21a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 54, Def. 18; Mulder 1989: 451, Def. 
19). 
Comment: Para-logotactic entities (Def. 1c2) or conglomerations of para-
logotactic entities (Def. 1c2) in combination (Def. 6c) with para-logotactic fea-
tures assume an identity of their own on the sentential level, i.e. they become 
sentential entities (Def. 21b), that is sentences (Def. 21) or clauses (Def. 21a) 
(adapted from Mulder 1989: 451). 
Def. 19a. ‘Contrastive para-logotactic (cf. Def. 19c) features (Def. 19)’ for ‘features 
(Def. 1c1) with the function of groupment over and above logotactic (cf. 
Def. 2a4c) groupment’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 54, Def. 18a; Mulder 
1989: 451, Def. 19a). 
Comment: “In language the suspensive, i.e. ‘comma’ or ‘semi-colon’ intonation 
type belong to this, but also the ‘distinctive’ types such as ‘finality’ (‘full-stop 
type’), ‘finality with emphasis’ (‘exclamation-type’), and ‘question’, though 
having a directly distinctive function [Def. 7a3], correspond, from another point 
of view, to contrastive features [Def. 1c1], as they too provide groupment” 
(Mulder 1989: 452). 
Def. 19b. ‘Distinctive (cf. Def. 7a3) para-logotactic (cf. Def. 19c) features (Def. 19)’ 
for ‘para-logotactic (cf. Def. 19c) features (Def. 19) that are in a direct rela-
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tion of opposition with other para-logotactic features (Def. 19) or with 
zero’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 54, Def. 18b; Mulder 1989: 452, Def. 
19b).  
Def. 19c. ‘Para-logotactics’ for ‘system (Def. 1b) of para-logotactic entities (Def. 
19d)’.  
Def. 19d. ‘Para-logotactic entity (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘logo (Def. 2a4) over and above the 
level of logotactics (Def. 2a4c)’. Alternative definition, ‘entity in para-
logotactics (Def. 19c)’.  
Def. 19e. ‘Para-logotagm’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in para-logotactics (Def. 19c)’.  
Def. 19f. ‘Para-ontotactics’ for ‘para-logotactics (Def. 19c), para-cenotactics (Def. 
18c), or para-delotactics (Def. 18i)’.  
Def. 20. ‘Para-ontotagm’ for ‘unit (Def. 9e) in para-ontotactics (Def. 19f)’. Alterna-
tive definition: ‘ontotactic (Def. 7c) entities (Def. 1c2) or conglomeration of 
ontotactic (Def. 7c) entities (Def. 1c2), together with accompanying para-
ontotactic features (Def. 17), such that the whole assumes an identity on a 
level different from the ontotactic (Def. 7c) level (i.e. the level of ontotactics 
(Def. 3b))’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 55, Def. 19; Mulder 1989: 452, 
Def. 20).  
Def. 20a. ‘Base’ for ‘in a para-ontotagm (Def. 20.), the total complex (Def. 6c) of 
those features (Def. 1c1) that correspond (on the level of para-ontotactics: 
Def. 19f) to the ontotactic (Def. 7c) entities (Def. 1c2)’ (cf. Mulder – 
Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20b; Mulder 1989: 452, Def. 20a). 
Comment: See also “basic entity” (Def. 1c2a). 
Def. 20b. ‘Complex (cf. Def. 6c) para-ontotagm (Def. 20)’ for ‘self-contained (Def. 
1b1) entity (Def. 1c2) constituted by two or more para-ontotagms (Def. 20), 
together with further accompanying para-ontotactic features (Def. 17)’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 19a; Mulder 1989: 452, Def. 20b). 
 
  
Axiom D. All semiotic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5) contain sentences (Def. 21) (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 56, Axiom D; Mulder 1989: 453, Axiom D). 
Comment: Axioms B, C and D together cover the whole of the cenology (Def. 
2b1a), logology (Def. 2a4a) and delology (Def. 2c1a), i.e. the system ontology 
(Def. 3a1a) (cf. Mulder 1989: 452–453).  
In Mulder’s revised version of the postulates Axiom D reads, “All semiotic 
systems contain sentences, constituted by a base and para-syntactic features” 
(Mulder 1989: 453). This contrasts with Axiom D in the earlier version of the 
postulates, which reads, “All semiotic systems contain sentences” (Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 56). I can see no need in specifying that all semiotic systems 
[Def. 1c, Def. 5] must have para-syntactic features [= para-logotactic features 
(Def. 19)], since in many cases these will merely be “zero” features (Def. 1c1). 
It seems more sensible to adopt the position indicated in the older version of the 
postulates that not all semiotic systems (Def. 1c, Def. 5) need have para-
ontotactics (Def. 19f).  
Axiom D sets the sentential level (as one aspect of the para-logotactics: Def. 
19c) apart from the rest of the logology (Def. 2a4a), especially the logotactics 
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(Def. 2a4c). This separation is one of the more conspicuous features of axio-
matic functionalism, and is designed to resolve some aspects of the dilemma of 
well-formedness vs. non-well-formedness (cf. Mulder 1989: 454).  
In the following Definitions, I do not consider descriptive issues in para-
delotactics (Def. 18i) paralleling those relating to sentence (Def. 21) and clause 
(Def. 21a). I have left these to be worked through in later and more developed 
versions of the postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism. 
Def. 21. ‘Sentence’ for ‘logo (Def. 2a4) (by definition corresponding to a signum 
(Def. 2a1, Def. 24)) with such features (Def. 1c1) that it cannot be a feature 
(Def. 1c1) (constituent (Def. 7f1) or other feature (Def. 1c1)) of another 
logo (Def. 2a4)’. Alternative definition: ‘signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) such 
that it is a self-contained (Def. 1b1) vehicle for conveying messages’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20; Mulder 1989: 453, Def. 21).  
Def. 21a ‘Clause’ for ‘immediate constituent (Def. 7f1a) (perhaps the only one) of a 
sentence (Def. 21)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20a; Mulder 
1989: 453, Def. 21a). 
Comment: A clause is therefore, by implication, also a para-logotactic entity 
(Def. 19d), and as all para-logotactic entities (Def. 19d) are sentential entities 
(Def. 21b), though not vice versa, a clause is a sentential entity (Def. 21b) 
(adapted from Mulder 1989: 453–454). 
Def. 21b. ‘Sentential features (Def. 1c1) or entities (Def. 1c2)’ for ‘such features (Def. 
1c1) or entities (Def. 1c2) as determine particular signa (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) 
to be sentences (Def. 21)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20c; 
Mulder 1989: 454, Def. 21b). 
Comment: These are not necessarily para-logotactic features (Def. 19), though 
the latter are necessarily sentential features (adapted from Mulder 1989: 454). 
Def. 21c. ‘Sentential markers’ for ‘occurrence dependent (cf. Def. 12a) sentential fea-
tures or entities (Def. 21b) that are not para-logotactic features (Def. 19) or 
entities (Def. 19d), but correspond to logotactic (cf. Def. 2a4c) features 
(Def. 1c1) or entities (Def. 7d, Def. 9b1)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 56, 
Def. 20c1; Mulder 1989: 454, Def. 21c). 
Comment: cf. the long discussion of sentential markers in Mulder (1989: 454). 
 
 
Axiom E. There may be a many-to-one relation between cenetic form (Def. 22a) and 
figura (Def. 2b) (alloceny (Def. 23a)), and between cenological form (Def. 
2b1d, Def. 23) and expression (Def. 24a) (allomorphy (Def. 24b1)), and 
vice versa: homoceny (Def. 25a) and homomorphy (Def. 26a) respectively. 
There may also be a many-to-one relationship between semantic form (Def. 
23b1) and denotation (Def. 2c) (allodely (Def. 23c1)), and between del-
ological form (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c) and content (Def. 24b) (allosemy (Def. 
24c1)), and vice versa: homodely (Def. 26k) and homosemy (Def. 26f) re-
spectively (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 59, Axiom E; Mulder 1989: 454, 
Axiom E).   
Comment: Axiom E and the ensuing Definitions deal with aspects of the signum 
ontology (Def. F4.4), principally at the allontic (cf. Def. 26o) level (i.e. the al-
 34
Dickins : Extended Axiomatic Functionalism: Postulates 
lontics; cf. Dickins 1998: 137; also Mulder 1989: 457). They also deal with the 
protocolising levels of general cenetics (Def. 22d) and general semantics (Def. 
23b4) allied to the signum ontology (Def. F4.4). 
 
Def. 22. ‘Cenetic image’ (symbolised: i) for ‘model for the unique form of a singular 
realisation (Def. F4.7), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4.6), in morphontics (Def. 
F3h)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 59, Def. 22; Mulder 1989: 454, Def. 
22), or for ‘model for the unique form of a single entity (Def. 1c2) which is 
capable of being the instantiation (Def. F4.6) of a figura (Def. 2b)’.   
Def. 22a. ‘Cenetic form’ (symbolised: f) for ‘class of impressionistically similar 
cenetic images (Def. 22)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 22a; 
Mulder 1989: 453, Def. 22a). Formal definition f={i}, the braces indicating 
that it is a self-contained (Def. 1b1) class of i. (cf. Mulder 1989: 445). 
Def. 22b. ‘Image cenetics’ for ‘the sub-theory dealing with the description of cenetic 
images (Def. 22)’.  
Def. 22c. ‘Form cenetics’ for ‘the sub-theory dealing with the description of cenetic 
forms (Def. 22a)’.  
Def. 22d. ‘General cenetics’ for ‘image cenetics (Def. 22b) and form cenetics (Def. 
22c)’.  
Def. 23. ‘Cenological form (symbolised: p)’ for ‘a particular self-contained (Def. 
1b1) class of one or more particular cenetic forms (Def. 22a) (i.e. {f}), each 
member f in its capacity of having a particular distinctive function (Def. 
7a3) d in cenology (Def. 2b1a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 60, Def. 23; 
Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 23). Formal definition: p = {fi...nRd}, where i...n indi-
cates ‘each one of a particular class’ (cf. Mulder 1989: 455). Alternative 
definition to Def. 2b1d.  
Def. 23a. ‘Alloceny’ for ‘one cenological form (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23), the manifesta-
tions (Def. 26o) of which corresponding to two or more cenetic forms (Def. 
22a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 60, Def. 23a; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 
23a). Formal definition: ‘fiRdi ~ fj Rdi’, where also j stands for an integer, 
signifying ‘a particular’ but i ≠ j, and ~ can be read as ‘compared with’. (cf. 
Mulder 1989: 455).  
Def. 23a1. ‘Allocene’ either for ‘one of the terms of ‘alloceny’ (Def. 23a) as a com-
parison’, or for ‘an allocenic entity (Def. 1c2) where there is no comparison 
with another allocenic entity (Def. 1c2), i.e. {i}Rd or fiRd’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 60, Def. 23a; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 23a1).  
Def. 23a2. ‘Allocenics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with the description of allocenes (second sense) (Def. 23a1) and re-
lated notions’.  
Def. 23a3. ‘Monoceny’ for ‘state of affairs in which a figura (Def. 2b) has only one al-
locene (second sense) (Def. 23a1)’.  
Def. 23a4. ‘Polyceny’ for ‘state of affairs in which a figura (Def. 2b) has more than one 
allocene (second sense) (Def. 23a1)’.  
Def. 23b. ‘Semantic image’ (symbolised: j) for ‘model for the unique form of a singu-
lar realisation (Def. F4.7), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4.6), in semantics 
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(Def. F4.3)’, or for ‘model for the unique form of a single entity (Def. 1c2) 
which is capable of being the instantiation (Def. F4.6) of a denotation (Def. 
2c)’. Alternative definition to Def. F4b.  
Def. 23b1. ‘Semantic form’ (symbolised: g) for ‘class of impressionistically similar 
semantic images (Def. 23b, Def. F4b)’. Formal definition: g={j}, the braces 
indicating that it is a self-contained (Def. 1b1) class of j (cf. Mulder 1989: 
445).  
Def. 23b2. ‘Image semantics’ for ‘the sub-theory dealing with the description of se-
mantic images (Def. 23b, Def. F4b)’.  
Def. 23b3. ‘Form semantics’ for ‘the sub-theory dealing with the description of seman-
tic forms (Def. 23b1)’. 
Def. 23b4. ‘General semantics’ for ‘image cenetics (Def. 23b2) and form semantics 
(Def. 23b3)’.  
Def. 23c. ‘Delological form (symbolised: q)’ for ‘a particular self-contained (Def. 
1b1) class of one or particular semantic forms (Def. 23b1) (i.e. {q}), each 
member q in its capacity of having a particular distinctive function (Def. 
7a3) e in delology (Def. 2c1a)’. Formal definition: q= {gi...nRe}, where i...n 
indicates ‘each one of a particular class’. Alternative definition to Def. 2c1d. 
Def. 23c1. ‘Allodely’ for ‘one denotation (Def. 2c), the manifestations (Def. 26o) of 
which corresponding to two or more semantic forms (Def. 23b1)’. Formal 
definition: giRei ~ gjRei, where also j stands for an integer, signifying ‘a par-
ticular’ but i≠ j and ~ can be read as ‘compared with’. 
Def. 23c2. ‘Allodele’ or ‘denotatum-type’ either for ‘one of the terms of ‘allodely’ 
(Def. 23c1) as a comparison’, or for ‘an allodelic entity (Def. 1c2) where 
there is no comparison with another allodelic entity (Def. 1c2), i.e. gRe or 
{j}Re’.  
Def. 23c3. ‘Allodelics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with the description of allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) and re-
lated notions’.  
Def. 23c4. ‘Monodely’ for ‘state of affairs in which a denotation (Def. 2c) has only one 
allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c2)’.  
Def. 23c5. ‘Polydely’ for ‘state of affairs in which a denotation (Def. 2c) has more than 
one allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c2)’.  
Def. 24. ‘Signum’ (symbolised: S) for ‘the conjunction of a particular expression 
(Def. 24a) and a particular content (Def. 24b), which mutually imply one 
another’. Formal definition: S= E&C, or S={pi...nRs}&{qi...nRs}.  
Comment: Alternative definition to Def. 2a1 (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 60, 
Def. 24; Mulder 1989:455, Def. 24). 
Def. 24a. ‘Expression’ (symbolised: E)) for ‘a particular self-contained (Def. 1b1) 
class of one or more particular cenological forms (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23) (i.e. 
{p}) each member in its capacity of having a particular distinctive function 
(cf. Def. 7a3) s’. Formal definition: E = {pi...nRs} (cf. Mulder and Hervey 
1980: 60, Def. 24a; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 24a). 
Comment: Mulder defines expression formally as: Ei = {fi...nRdi}, commenting, 
“As p has already distinctive function incorporated, i.e. pi = {fi...nRdi}, the dis-
tinctive function d in ‘Expression’ (or in ‘Content’, or in ‘Signum’) is by impli-
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cation distinctive function at a further level, i.e. on the signum-level” (Mulder 
1989: 456). This elegant proposal seems to be ruled out in the extended version 
(and arguably also in the standard version) by virtue of the need to incorporate 
on a coherent basis a definition for both cenete (Def. F3d), i.e. iRd, and 
morphete (or form in Hervey’s sense) (Def. F1b1a0), i.e. iRs (cf. Dickins 1998: 
422–423; Note 9). 
Def. 24b. ‘Content’ (symbolised: C)) for ‘a particular self-contained (Def. 1b1) class 
of one or more particular delological forms (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c) (i.e. {q} ) 
each member in its capacity of having a particular distinctive function (Def. 
7a3) s’. Formal definition: C = {qi...nRs} (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, 
Def. 24b; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 24b).  
Def. 24b1. ‘Allomorphy’ for ‘one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), the allomorphic (cf. Def. 
24b1b) manifestations (Def. 26o) of which corresponding to two or more 
cenological forms (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23)’. Formal definition: piRsi ~ pjRsi (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 24a1; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 24b1).  
Def. 24b1a. ‘Allomorph’ either for ‘one of the terms of ‘allomorphy’ (Def. 24b1) as a 
comparison’, or for ‘an allomorphic entity (Def. 1c2) where there is no 
comparison with another allomorphic entity (Def. 1c2), i.e. piRsi’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 24a1; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 24b1a). 
 Def. 24b1b. ‘Allomorphics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with the description of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) and 
related notions’.  
Def. 24b1c. ‘Monomorphy’ for ‘state of affairs in which a signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) 
has only one allomorph (second sense) (Def. 24b1a)’.  
Def. 24b1d. ‘Polymorphy’ for ‘state of affairs in which a signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) has 
more than one allomorph (second sense) (Def. 24b1a)’.  
Def. 24b1e. ‘Allomorphon’ for ‘a particular cenetic form (Def. 22a) in its capacity of 
standing in relation to a particular distinctive function (Def. 7a3) in cenol-
ogy (Def. 2b1a) in its capacity of standing in relation to a particular distinc-
tive function (Def. 7a3) in logology (Def. 2a4a)’. Formal definition: (fRd)Rs 
or {(iRd)Rs}.  
Def. 24b1f. ‘Allomorphony’ for ‘one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) the allomorphonic (cf. 
Def. 24b1h) manifestations (Def. 26o) of which corresponding to one cen-
ological form (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23), but to more than one cenetic form (Def. 
22a)’.  
Def. 24b1g. ‘Polymorphony’ for ‘state of affairs in which a signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) 
has more than one allomorphon (Def. 24b1e)’.  
Def. 24b1h. ‘Allomorphonics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. 
F4.4) dealing with the description of allomorphons (Def. 24b1e)’.  
Def. 24c1. ‘Allosemy’ for ‘one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), the allosemic (cf. Def. 
24c1b) manifestations (Def. 26p) of which corresponding to two or more 
delological forms (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c)’. Formal definition: qiRsi ~ qjRsi. 
Def. 24c1a. ‘Alloseme’ either for ‘one of the terms of ‘allosemy’ (Def. 24c1) as a com-
parison’, or for ‘an allosemic entity (Def. 1c2) where there is no comparison 
with another allosemic entity (Def. 1c2), i.e. qiRsi’.  
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Def. 24c1b. ‘Allosemics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with the description of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) and 
related notions’.  
Def. 24c1c. ‘Monosemy’ for ‘state of affairs in which a signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) has 
only one alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c1a)’.  
Def. 24c1d. ‘Polysemy’ for ‘state of affairs in which a signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) has 
more than one alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c1a)’. 
Def. 24c1e. ‘Allosemon’ or ‘reference-type’ for ‘a particular semantic form (Def. 23b1) 
in its capacity of standing in relation to a particular distinctive function 
(Def. 7a3) in delology (Def. 2c1a) in its capacity of standing in relation to a 
particular distinctive function (Def. 7a3) in logology (Def. 2a4a)’. Formal 
definition: (gRe)Rs or {(jRe)Rs}.  
Def. 24c1f. ‘Allosemony’ for ‘one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) the allosemonic (cf. Def. 
24c1h) manifestation (Def. 26o) of which corresponding to one delological 
form (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c), but to more than one semantic form (Def. 
23b1)’.  
Def. 24c1g. ‘Polysemony’ for ‘state of affairs in which one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) 
has more than one allosemon (Def. 24c1e)’.  
Def. 24c1h. ‘Allosemonics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with the description of allosemons (Def. 24c1e)’.  
Def. 25. ‘Homocene’ for ‘allocene (second sense) (Def. 23a1) of one figura (Def. 2b) 
in comparison with and having the same cenetic form (Def. 22a) as allocene 
(second sense) (Def. 23a1) of another figura (Def. 2b)’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 25; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 25).  
Def. 25a.  ‘Homoceny’ for ‘relationship obtaining between homocenes (Def. 25). 
Formal definition of homoceny: fiRdi ~ fiRdj, i≠j.  
Def. 25b. ‘Heterocene’ for ‘allocene (second sense) (Def. 23a1) of one figura (Def. 
2b) in comparison with and having a different cenetic form (Def. 22a) from 
allocene (second sense) (Def. 23a1) of another figura (Def. 2b)’.   
Def. 25c. ‘Heteroceny’ for ‘relationship between heterocenes (Def. 25b). Formal defi-
nition of heteroceny: f iRdi ~ f jRdj, i≠j.  
Def. 25d. ‘Cene’ for ‘allocene (second sense) (Def. 23a1), homocene (Def. 25b), or 
heterocene (Def. 25c)’.  
Comment: Since homocene (Def. 25b) and heterocene (Def. 25c), but not allo-
cene (second sense) (Def. 23a1) imply more than one entity (Def. 1c2), where 
only a single cene is referred to, this is necessarily an allocene (second sense) 
(Def. 23a1). 
Def. 26. ‘Homomorph’ for ‘allomorph (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) of one signum 
(Def. 2a1, Def. 24), in comparison with and having the same cenological 
form (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23) as allomorph (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) of an-
other signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 26; 
Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 26).  
 Def. 26a. ‘Homomorphy’ for ‘relationship obtaining between homomorphs (Def. 26)’. 
Formal definition of homomorphy: piRsi ~ piRsj, i≠j.  
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Def. 26b. ‘Heteromorph’ for ‘allomorph (second sense) (Def. 24b1a)) of one signum 
(Def. 2a1, Def. 24), in comparison with and having a different cenological 
form (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23) from, allomorph (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) of 
another signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’.    
Def. 26c. ‘Heteromorphy’ for ‘relationship obtaining between heteromorphs (Def. 
26b)’. Formal definition of heteromorphy: piRsi ~ pj Rsj, i≠j.  
Def. 26d. ‘Morph’ for ‘allomorph (Def. 24b1a), homomorph (Def. 26), or hetero-
morph (Def. 26b)’.  
Comment: Since homomorph (Def. 26) and heteromorph (Def. 26b), but not al-
lomorph (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) imply more than one entity (Def. 1c2), 
where only a single morph is referred to, this is necessarily an allomorph (sec-
ond sense) (Def. 24b1a). Cf. standard axiomatic functionalism, Def. F6. 
Def. 26e. ‘Homoseme’ for ‘alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of one signum (Def. 
2a1, Def. 24), in comparison with and having the same delological form 
(Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c) as alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of another 
signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’.   
Def. 26f.  ‘Homosemy’ for ‘relationship obtaining between homosemes (Def. 26e)’. 
Formal definition of homosemy: qiRsi ~ q i Rsj, i≠j.  
Def. 26g. ‘Heteroseme’ for ‘alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of one signum 
(Def. 2a1, Def. 24), in comparison with and having a different delological 
form (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c) from alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of 
another signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’.   
Def. 26h. ‘Heterosemy’ for ‘relationship obtaining between heterosemes (Def. 26g)’. 
Formal definition of heterosemy: qi Rsi ~ qjRsj, i≠j.  
Def. 26i. ‘Seme’ for ‘alloseme (Def. 24c1a), homoseme (Def. 26e), or heteroseme 
(Def. 26g)’.  
Comment: Since homoseme (Def. 26e) and heteroseme (Def. 26g), but not al-
loseme (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) imply more than one entity (Def. 1c2), 
where only a single seme is referred to, this is necessarily an alloseme (second 
sense) (Def. 24c1a). 
Def. 26j. ‘Homodele’ for ‘allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of one denotation (Def. 
2c) in comparison with and having the same semantic form (Def. 23b1) as 
allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of another denotation (Def. 2c)’.  
Def. 26k.  ‘Homodely’ for ‘relationship obtaining between homodeles (Def. 26j)’. 
Formal definition of homodely: g i Rei ~ g i Rej, i≠j.  
Def. 26l. ‘Heterodele’ for ‘allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of one denotation 
(Def. 2c) in comparison with and having a different semantic form (Def. 
23b1) from allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of another denotation (Def. 
2c)’.   
Def. 26m. ‘Heterodely’ for ‘relationship obtaining betwen heterodeles (Def. 26m). 
Formal definition of heterodely: g i Rei ~ gjRej, i≠j.  
Def. 26n. ‘Dele’ for ‘allodele (Def. 23c2), homodele (Def. 26j), or heterodele (Def. 
26l)’.  
Comment: Since homodele (Def. 26j) and heterodele (Def. 26l), but not allodele 
(second sense) (Def. 23c2) imply more than one entity (Def. 1c2), where only a 
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single dele is referred to, this is necessarily an allodele (second sense) (Def. 
23c2). 
Def. 26o. ‘Allont’ or ‘manifestation’ for ‘allomorph (Def. 24b1a), allomorphon (Def. 
24b1e), alloseme (Def. 24c1a), allosemon (Def. 24c1e), allocene (Def. 
23a1), or allodele (Def. 23c2)’.  
Comment: See also: instantiation (Def. F4.6), realisation (Def. F4.7). 
Def. 27. ‘Homonym’ for ‘total homonym (Def. 27a) or partial homonym (Def. 
27b)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 27; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 
27).  
Def. 27a. ‘Total homonym’ for ‘total class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) 
of one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) in comparison with, and the cenological 
forms (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23) of its members being the same as, those of the 
total class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) of another signum 
(Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 27; Mulder 
1989: 456, Def. 27).  
Def. 27b. ‘Partial homonym’ for ‘at least one member of class of allomorphs (second 
sense) (Def. 24b1a) of one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), in comparison with 
and having the same cenological form (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23) as at least one 
member of class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) as another sig-
num (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), but the two signa (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) not being to-
tally homonymous (Def. 27a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 27; 
Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 27).   
Def. 27c. ‘Homonymy’ for ‘total homonymy (Def. 27d) or partial homonymy (Def. 
27e)’.  
Def. 27d. ‘Total homonymy’ for ‘state of affairs in which total class of allomorphs 
(second sense) (Def. 24b1a) of one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) is compared 
with, and has the same cenological forms (Def. 2b1d, Def. 23) as, those of 
the total class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) of another signum 
(Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’.  
Def. 27e. ‘Partial homonymy’ for ‘state of affairs in which at least one member of 
class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b1a) of one signum (Def. 2a1, 
Def. 24), is compared with and has the same cenological form (Def. 2b1d, 
Def. 23) as at least one member of class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 
24b1a) of another signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), but the two signa (Def. 2a1, 
Def. 24) are not totally homonymous (cf. Def. 27a)’. 
Def. 28. ‘Synonym’ for ‘total synonym (Def. 28a) or partial synonym (Def. 
28b)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 28; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 
28).  
Def. 28a. ‘Total synonym’ for ‘total class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of 
one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) in comparison with, and the delological 
forms (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c) of its members being the same as, those of the 
total class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of another signum (Def. 
2a1, Def. 24)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 28; Mulder 1989: 456, 
Def. 28).  
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Def. 28b. ‘Partial synonym’ for ‘at least one member of class of allosemes (second 
sense) (Def. 24c1a) of one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), in comparison with 
and having the same delological form (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c) as at least one 
member of class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of another sig-
num (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), but the two signa (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) not being to-
tally synonymous (Def. 28a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 28; 
Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 28).  
Def. 28c. ‘Synonymy’ for ‘total synonymy (Def. 28d) or partial synonymy (Def. 
28e)’.  
Def. 28d. ‘Total synonymy’ for ‘state of affairs in which total class of allosemes (sec-
ond sense) (Def. 24c1a) of one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) is compared 
with, and has the same delological forms (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c) as, those of 
the total class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of another signum 
(Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’.  
Def. 28e. ‘Partial synonymy’ for ‘state of affairs in which at least one member of class 
of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of one signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), 
is compared with and has the same delological form (Def. 2c1d, Def. 23c) 
as at least one member of class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c1a) of 
another signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), but the two signa (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) 
are not totally synonymous (cf. Def. 28a)’.  
Comment: In extended axiomatic functionalism a distinction is made be-
tween two senses of ‘utterance’: ‘logete’ (Def. F1b0a), and ‘logonete’ 
(Def. F1b0b). 
 
 
Axiom F. Signa (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) may be instantiated (cf. Def. F4.6) an unlimited 
number of times each resulting utterance (Def. F1a, Def. F1b0a, Def. 
F1bab) being a member of a potentially infinite class of utterances (Def. 
F1a, Def. F1b0a, Def. F1bab).  
Comment: Axiom F in the standard version deals with the semantics (cf. Mulder 
and Hervey 1980: 203–211; Mulder 1989: 457). In the extended version, some 
of what is covered by standard axiomatic-functionalist semantics is subsumed 
under the system ontology (Def. 3a1a), and as such is dealt with by Axioms B, 
C and D and ensuing Definitions. Other aspects of what is covered by the stan-
dard axiomatic-functionalist semantics are subsumed under the extended axio-
matic-functionalist signum ontology (Def. F4.4), and as such are dealt with par-
tially by Axiom E and ensuing Definitions.  
In the extended version, Axiom F – though closely related in form to Axiom 
F in the standard version – deals not with semantics (cf. Def. F4.3 for a defini-
tion of semantics under the extended version), but with aspects of the signum 
ontology (Def. F4.4) not dealt with by Axiom E.  
In the following Definitions I have attempted as far as possible to retain the 
numbers used by Hervey in his postulates for axiomatic-functionalist semantics 
(Mulder and Hervey 1980: 203–211). Hervey’s Definitions are numbered from 
1a. As noted in the Introduction to these Postulates, I have prefixed “F” to each 
of the corresponding Definition numbers in this version of the postulates in or-
der to specify that the following Definitions relate to Axiom F, and to differen-
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tiate them from what would sometimes otherwise be identically labelled Defini-
tions under Axioms A and B. 
 
Def. F1a. ‘Utterance (both senses: see Def. F1b0a, Def. F1b0b below)’ for ‘member 
of a signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) (as a class) such that it is a model for a sin-
gle realisation (Def. F4.7), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4.6), of that signum 
(Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 203, Def. 1a). 
Comment: “This means that “utterance” is to be understood, not in the sense of 
single communication-act as such, but as a construct or model accounting for 
and applying to a single communication-act. Furthermore, it is to be noted that 
this model applies only to communication-acts that are realisations of signa, i.e. 
realisations that convey information as determined by the conventions govern-
ing the appropriate signa. In actual fact only sentences are realised in communi-
cations, but since sentences may contain several signa, we may also say that 
each of these signa is, itself ‘separately’ realised (within the sentence). Conse-
quently, every signum, whether it is a sentence, or can correspond to, or be part 
of, a sentence-base (Mulder’s Def. 20b), can be said to be realised in actual 
communication. This gives us the right to account or individual realisations of 
any signum by setting up a unique model, i.e. “utterance”, for each of these re-
alisations. In this way we are entitled to regard every signum as a class of “ut-
terances”, each member of which class is a model for a single realisation of the 
appropriate signum” (Hervey 1980: 203). 
Def. F1b0a. ‘Logete’ or ‘Utterance (1st sense; Def. F1a)’ for ‘a conjunction of a 
morphete (Def. F1b1a0) and a semete (Def. F1b2a0)’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 203, Def. 1b). Formal definition: iRs & jRs. 
Comment: Cf. standard axiomatic functionalism Def. F1b. 
Def. F1b0b. ‘Logonete’ or ‘Utterance (2nd sense: Def. F1a)’ (symbolised: U) for ‘a con-
junction of a morphonete (Def. F1b1a4) and a semonete (Def. F1b2a5)’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 203, Def. 1b). Formal definition: U = (iRd)Rs & 
(jRe)Rs or U = F&R.  
Comment: Cf. standard axiomatic functionalism Def. F1b. 
Def. F1b0c. ‘Logetics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) deal-
ing with logetes (Def. F1b0a) or logonetes (F1b0b)’. 
Def. F1b0d. ‘Logotics’ for ‘morphotics’ (Def. F1b1a2) and ‘semotics’ (Def. F1b2a2). 
Def. F1b0e. ‘Logonetics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with logonetes (F1b0b)’.  
Def. F1b1a0. ‘Morphete’ or ‘form (1st sense: cf. Def. F1b1b)’ for ‘cenetic image (Def. 
22) in its capacity of having the particular distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a3) 
appropriate to a particular signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’. Formal definition: 
iRs (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 204, Def. 11b1a).  
Def. F1b1a1. ‘Morphetics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with morphetes (Def. F1b1a0)’.  
Def. F1b1a2. ‘Morphotics’ for ‘morphologics (Def. F1b1a3), allomorphics (Def. 24b1b), 
morphonetics (Def. F1b1a5), and morphetics (Def. F1b1a1)’.  
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Def. F1b1a3. ‘Morphologics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
corresponding to logology (Def. 2a4a) in the system ontology (Def. 3a1a) 
and dealing with expressions (Def. 24a)’.  
Def. F1b1a4. ‘Morphonete’ or ‘form (2nd sense: cf. Def. F1b1b)’ (symbolised: F) for 
‘cenetic image (Def. 22) in its capacity of having the particular distinctive 
function (cf. Def. 7a3) appropriate to a particular figura (Def. 2b), in its ca-
pacity of having the distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a3) appropriate to a par-
ticular signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’. Symbolised: F. Formal definition: F = 
(iRd)Rs (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 204, Def. 1b1a).  
Def. F1b1a5. ‘Morphonetics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with morphonetes (Def. F1b1a4)’.  
Def. F1b1b. ‘Form (both senses)’ for ‘member of an expression (Def. 24a) as a class, 
such that it is a model for a single realisation (Def. F4.7), i.e. an instantia-
tion (Def. F4.6), of that expression (Def. 24a)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 
1980: 204, Def. 1b1b). 
Comment: “Informally, we may say that the form of an utterance accounts for 
the necessary aspect of ‘substance’ without which a signum cannot be realised 
in actual communication. At the same time the form of an utterance is a ‘token’ 
of the expression (see Mulder’s Def. 24a) of the signum whose realisation the 
given utterance is a model for. That is to say, a form is an intrinsic aspect of an 
utterance, in the same way that an expression is an intrinsic aspect of a signum” 
(Hervey 1980: 203–204).  
“Thus the form of an utterance accounts for the spatio-temporally unique na-
ture of the realisation for which the given utterance is a model, at the same time 
as incalculating the fact of that unique realisation being the realisation of a sig-
num with a particular grammatically [cf. logologically (Def. 2a4a)] distinctive 
function” (Hervey 1980: 204). 
Def. F1b2a0. ‘Semete’ or ‘reference (1st sense)’ for ‘semantic image (Def. 23b, Def. F4b) 
in its capacity of having the particular distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a3) ap-
propriate to a particular signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’. Formal definition: 
jRs (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 204, Def. 1b2a).  
Def. F1b2a1. ‘Semetics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) deal-
ing with semetes (Def. F1b2a0)’.  
Def. F1b2a2. ‘Semotics’ for ‘semologics (Def. F1b2a3), allosemics (Def. 24c1b), se-
monetics (Def. F1b2a6), and semetics (Def. F1b2a1)’.  
Def. F1b2a3. ‘Semologics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
corresponding to logology (Def. 2a4a) in the system ontology (Def. 3a1a) 
and dealing with contents (Def. 24b)’.  
Def. F1b2a4. ‘Logologics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
corresponding to logology (Def. 2a4a) in the system ontology (Def. 3a1a) 
and dealing with signa (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’.  
Def. F1b2a5. ‘Semonete’ or ‘reference (2nd sense)’ (symbolised: R) for ‘semantic image 
(Def. 23b, Def. F4b) in its capacity of having the particular distinctive func-
tion (cf. Def. 7a3) appropriate to a particular denotation (Def. 2c), in its ca-
pacity of having the distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a3) appropriate to a par-
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ticular signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24)’. Formal definition: R = (jRe)Rs (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 204, Def. 1b2a).  
Def. F1b2a6. ‘Semonetics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
dealing with semonetes (Def. F1b2a5)’.  
Def. F1b2b. ‘Reference (both senses)’ for ‘member of a content (Def. 24b) as a class, 
such that it is a model for a single realisation (Def. F4.7), i.e. an instantia-
tion (Def. F4.6), of that content (Def. 24b)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
204, Def. 1b2b). 
Comment: “A reference accounts for the necessary information-bearing aspect 
without which no act could be construed as a communication-act, let alone the 
realisation of a signum. Form and reference are merely two equally relevant and 
equally important ways of looking at the same thing (i.e. utterance). Form and 
reference as ‘tokens’ of expression and content respectively, may be conceived 
as the converse of one another. This is analogous with the way expression and 
content, themselves, are each other’s converse (see Mulder’s Def. 24). In intui-
tive terms this view of form and reference can be explained by pointing out that 
form accounts for the fact that an utterance is not mere substance, but substance 
necessarily linked with information-content, whereas reference accounts for the 
fact that an utterance is not just an information-content, but an information-
content necessarily linked to a substance” (Hervey 1980: 204).  
“We may say that looking at an utterance from the aspect of reference is 
looking at that aspect of the realisation which links it to the actual piece of in-
formation conveyed by ... that realisation” (Hervey 1980: 205). 
Def. F2. ‘Class of equivalent logetes (Def. F1b0a) (or: utterances: Def. F1a, first 
sense)’ for ‘the set of all and only the logetes (Def. F1b0a) (or: utterances: 
Def. F1a, first sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 
24) as a class’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2).  
Def. F2.1. ‘Class of equivalent logonetes (Def. F1b0b) (or: utterances: Def. F1a, sec-
ond sense)’ for ‘the set of all and only the logonetes (Def. F1b0b) (or: utter-
ances: Def. F1a, second sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 
2a1, Def. 24) as a class’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2). 
Comment: “A signum can now be treated ... as a class of equivalent utterances” 
(Hervey 1980: 205). 
Def. F2a. ‘Class of equivalent morphetes (Def. F1b1a0) (or: forms: Def. F1b1b, first 
sense)’ for ‘the set of all and only the morphetes (or: forms, Def. F1b1b, 
first sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) as a 
class’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2a).  
Def. F2a1. ‘Class of equivalent morphonetes (Def. F1b1a4) (or: forms, Def. F1b1b, 
second sense)’ for ‘the set of all and only the morphonetes (or: forms, Def. 
F1b1a4, second sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a1, 
Def. 24) as a class’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2a). 
Comment: “... we may conceive of an expression as a class of equivalent forms” 
(Hervey 1980: 205). 
Def. F2b. ‘Class of equivalent semetes (Def. F1b2a0) (or: references, Def. F1b2b, first 
sense)’ for ‘the set of all and only the semetes (Def. F1b2a0) (or: references, 
 44
Dickins : Extended Axiomatic Functionalism: Postulates 
Def. F1b2b, first sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a1, 
Def. 24) as a class’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2b).  
Def. F2b1. ‘Class of equivalent semonetes (Def. F1b2a5) (or: references, Def. F1b2b, 
second sense)’ for ‘the set of all and only the semonetes (Def. F1b2a5) (or: 
references, Def. F1b2b, second sense) which are members of a given sig-
num (Def. 2a1, Def. 24) as a class’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 
2b). 
Comment: “... we may conceive of a content as a class of equivalent references” 
(Hervey 1980: 205).  
Defs. 3a, 3b, and 3c in Hervey (1980: 205–206) provide definitions for form 
class, reference class, and form-reference class. These definitions are no longer 
needed in the extended version, since they are superseded by the notions mor-
phonete (Def. F1b1a1) and semonete (Def. 1b2a1). They do not therefore ap-
pear in the Postulates for Extended Axiomatic Functionalism. 
Def. F3d. ‘Cenete’ for ‘member of a figura (Def. 2b) (as a class) such that it is a model 
for a single realisation (Def. F4.7), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4.6), of that 
figura (Def. 2b)’. Formal definition: iRd.  
Def. F3e. ‘Cenetics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) deal-
ing with the description of cenetes (Def. F3d)’.  
Def. F3f. ‘Cenotics’ for ‘cenologics (Def. F3g), allocenics (Def. 23a2), and cenetics 
(Def. F3e)’.  
Def. F3g. ‘Cenologics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) 
corresponding to cenology (Def. 2b1a) in the system ontology (Def. 3a1a)’. 
Def. F3h. ‘Morphontics’ for ‘morphotics (Def.F1b1a2) and cenotics (Def. F3f)’.  
Def. F4. ‘Delete’ or ‘denotatum’ for ‘member of a denotation (Def. 2c) (as a class) 
such that it is a model for a single realisation (Def. F4.7), i.e. an instantia-
tion (Def. F4.6), of that denotation (Def. 2c)’. Formal definition: jRe. Alter-
native definitions: ‘model for an ostensible (Def. F4b1) entity denoted (cf. 
Def. 4a) by utterances (Def. F1a, Def. F1b0a, Def. 1b0b)’; ‘model for an os-
tensible (Def. F4b1) entity expressed by an index (Def. 2) as an item (i.e. as 
a member of an index (Def. 2) as a class of items)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 
1980: 206, Def. 4). 
Comment: In extended axiomatic functionalism, a delete (denotatum) is a model 
for a “piece of information”. Entities which are such “pieces of information” 
“may be objects, qualities, processes, relations, or complex circumstances. They 
may, furthermore, be ‘real’ entities, ‘candidates for reality’, or purely abstract or 
fictional” (Hervey 1980: 206). 
Def. F4.0. ‘Deletics’ for ‘the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) deal-
ing with deletes (Def. F4)’.  
Def. F4.1. ‘Delotics’ for ‘delologics (Def. F4.2), allodelics (Def. 23c3), and deletics 
(Def. F4.0)’.  
Def. F4.2. ‘Delologics’ for ‘sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4.4) corre-
sponding to delology (Def. 2c1a) in the system ontology (Def. 3a1a)’.  
Def. F4.3. ‘Semantics’ for ‘semotics (Def. F1b2a2) and delotics (Def. F4.1)’.  
Def. F4.4. ‘Signum ontology’ for ‘morphontics (Def. F3h) and semantics (Def. F4.3)’. 
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Def. F4.5. ‘Semiotics’ for ‘system ontology’ (Def. 3a1a) and ‘signum ontology (Def. 
F4.4)’.  
Def. F4.6. ‘Ontete’ or ‘instantiation’ for ‘cenete (Def. F3d), morphete (Def. F1b1a0), 
morphonete (Def. F1b1a4), logete (Def. F1b0a), logonete (Def. F1b0b), se-
mete (Def. F1b2a0), semonete (Def. F1b2a5), or delete (Def. F4)’.  
Comment: See also: manifestation (Def. 26o), realisation (Def. F4.7). 
Def. F4.7. ‘Realisation’ for ‘allont (manifestation) (Def. 26o), or ontete (instantiation) 
(Def. F4.6)’.   
Def. F4a. ‘Denote’ for ‘refer to by virtue of conventions relevant to semiotic systems 
(Def. 1c, Def. 5)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4a). 
Comment: See discussion in Dickins 1998: 117–125.  
Def. F4b. ‘Semantic image’ for ‘model for the unique form of a single actually or po-
tentially ostensible (Def. F4b1) entity which is capable of being expressed 
by the instantiation (Def. F4.6) of a least one denotation (Def. 2c)’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4b), or for ‘model for the unique form 
of a single entity which is capable of being the instantiation (Def. F4.6) of a 
denotation (Def. 2c)’; or for ‘model for an actually or potentially ostensible 
(Def. F4b1) entity capable of being expressed by an index (Def. 2) as an 
item (i.e. as a member of an index (Def. 2) as a class of items)’. Symbolised: 
j. Alternative definition to Def. 23b.  
Comment: “By “potentially ostensible entity” is meant an entity which, although 
its existence has not been instanced in a concrete sense (e.g. a fictional entity), 
would be ostensible in certain specifiable ways. For instance, an entity unicorn, 
would if it ‘existed’, be ostensible via direct evidence of sight” (Hervey 1980: 
206). 
Def. F4b1. ‘Ostensible’ for ‘distinct from at least one other entity or from its own ab-
sence’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4b1). 
Comment: “It will be noted that ‘ostension’ is interpreted here in terms of the 
functional principle, whereby any ‘positive’ term acquires its identity ‘nega-
tively’, through opposition to other terms” (Hervey 1980: 206).  
Hervey’s Def. 5 (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 206) provides a definition for 
denotation in standard axiomatic functionalism. The rather different notion of 
denotation in extended axiomatic functionalism is defined in these postulates by 
Def. 2c.  
Hervey’s Defs. 5a and 5b (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 206) provide a defini-
tion for denotation class in standard axiomatic functionalism. Like the notions 
form class, reference class, and form-reference class (see comment above; 
Hervey’s definitions 3a, 3b and 3c), these notions are not required in the ex-
tended version.  
Hervey’s Def. 6 (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 206–207) provides a definition 
of morph in terms of the intersection of a particular form class (Hervey’s Def. 
3a: Mulder and Hervey 1980: 205) and a particular class of equivalent utter-
ances (Hervey’s Def. 2: Mulder and Hervey 1980: 205). A similar definition 
would not hold for extended axiomatic functionalism. This numbered definition 
does not therefore appear in these postulates. The rather different notion of 
morph in extended axiomatic functionalism is defined in Def. 26d (cf. also 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 24a1).  
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Hervey’s Def. 6a (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 207) provides a definition for 
homomorphy in standard axiomatic functionalism. This is superseded in the 
current postulates by Def. 26a. 
Def. F7a1. ‘Hyperonym’ or ‘superordinate’ for ‘denotation (Def. 2c), the set of seman-
tic forms (Def. 23b1) of whose allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) consid-
ered in relation to, and properly including, the set of semantic forms (Def. 
23b1) of allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of another denotation (Def. 
2c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 207, Def. 7a1). 
Comment: Def. F7a1 and all subsequent definitions are to be interpreted in the 
light of the proposed framework for semantic protocolisation presented in Dick-
ins (1998: 103–117) and the additional comments related to this in Dickins 
(1998: 128–138). The provisional nature of the proposed framework for seman-
tic protocolisation is also stressed, alongside the expectation that further devel-
opment of this framework will entail changes to Def. F7a1 and all subsequent 
definitions.  
In particular, it may be that forms of words such as “the set of semantic 
forms (Def. 23b1)” (in Def. F7a1, and other definitions), should be rephrased 
along the lines, “the set of (global) referential entities/situations of the semantic 
forms” (cf. Dickins 1998: 103–117 for a discussion of the notion referential en-
tity and associated notions). This would make specific allowance for compari-
son of denotations (Def. 2c) corresponding to delos (Def. 2c1) of differing de-
grees of complexity (cf. Def. 6c); e.g. it would make it possible to describe 
forms such as “The adult horse ate the grass” as compared with “The grass was 
eaten by the stallion” in terms of a hyperonym (Def. F7a1)-hyponym (Def. 
F7a2) relationship (cf. Dickins 1998: 103–117). 
Def. F7a2. ‘Hyponym’ for ‘denotation (Def. 2c), the set of semantic forms (Def. 23b1) 
of whose allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) considered in relation to, and 
properly included in, the set of semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of allodeles 
(second sense) (Def. 23c2) of another denotation (Def. 2c)’ (cf. Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 207, Def. 7a2).  
Def. F7a1a. ‘Direct hyperonym’ or ‘direct superordinate’ for ‘first denotation (Def. 2c) 
which is a hyperonym (Def. F7a1) of a second denotation (Def. 2c), without 
also being a hyperonym (Def. F7a1) of any third denotation (Def. 2c) which 
is itself a hyperonym (Def. F7a1) of the second denotation (Def. 2c)’ (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 207, Def. 7a1a). 
Comment: If denotation (Def. 2c) A is a hyperonym (Def. F7a1) of denotation 
(Def. 2c) B, but there is no other denotation (Def. 2c) C which is also a hypero-
nym (Def. F7a1) of denotation (Def. 2c) B and a hyponym (Def. F7a2) of deno-
tation (Def. 2c) A, denotation (Def. 2c) A is a direct hyperonym of denotation 
(Def. 2c) B. 
Def. F7a2a. ‘Direct hyponym’ for ‘first denotation (Def. 2c) which is a hyponym (Def. 
F7a2) of a second denotation (Def. 2c), without also being a hyponym (Def. 
F7a2) of any third denotation (Def. 2c) which is itself a hyponym (Def. 
F7a2) of the second denotation (Def. 2c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
207, Def. 7a2a). 
Comment: If denotation (Def. 2c) A is a hyponym (Def. F7a2) of denotation 
(Def. 2c) B, but there is no other denotation (Def. 2c) C which is also a hypo-
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nym (Def. F7a2) of denotation (Def. 2c) B and a hyperonym (Def. F7a1) of de-
notation (Def. 2c) A, denotation (Def. 2c) A is a direct hyponym of denotation 
B (Def. 2c).  
Hervey includes a definition for the notion semantic feature (Mulder and 
Hervey 1980: 208, Def. 7a1b). This notion is not required in the extended ver-
sion.  
Hervey includes a definition for the notion of synonym (Mulder and Hervey 
1980: 208, Def. 7b). This is not required in the extended version, since it is cov-
ered by Defs. 28, 28a, and 28b. 
Def. F7c. ‘Paronym’ for ‘first denotation (Def. 2c), the set of semantic forms (Def. 
23b1) of whose allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) considered in relation 
to the set of semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of allodeles (second sense) (Def. 
23c2) of a second denotation (Def. 2c), and the sets of semantic forms (Def. 
23b1) of allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of the first and second denota-
tions (Def. 2c) not including one another, but these sets of semantic forms 
(Def. 23b1) of allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) being properly included 
in the sets of semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of allodeles (second sense) (Def. 
23c2) of a third denotation (Def. 2c)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 208, 
Def. 7c). 
Comment: The denotations (Def. 2c) rose and tulip are thus paronyms with re-
spect to the denotation (Def. 2c) flower. In this case, the semantic forms (Def. 
23b1) of the sets of allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of rose and tulip do not 
include one another; in fact they do not intersect at all. Partial overlap may also 
hold between the allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of paronyms, as in the 
case, for instance, of the denotations (Def. 2c) red and orange (adapted from 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 208). 
Def. F7c1. ‘Paronymy set’ for ‘set of two or more paronyms (Def. 7c) the sum of the 
semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of whose allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) 
exhausts the set of the semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of the allodeles (second 
sense) (Def. 23c2) of their common hyperonym (Def. F7a1)’ (cf. Mulder 
and Hervey 1980: 208, Def. 7c1).  
Def. F7c2. ‘Exclusive paronyms’ for ‘paronyms (Def. 7c) the sets of the semantic 
forms (Def. 23b1) of whose allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) do not in-
tersect’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 208, Def. 7c2). 
Comment: The denotations (Def. 2c) stallion, mare, filly and colt are all exclu-
sive paronyms (Def. 7c), since there is no overlap between the members of the 
sets of the semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of their allodeles (second sense) (Def. 
23c2) (adapted from Mulder and Hervey 1980: 209). 
Def. F7c3. ‘Overlapping paronyms’ for ‘paronyms (Def. 7c) the sets of the semantic 
forms (Def. 23b1) of whose allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) do inter-
sect’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 208, Def. 7c3). 
Comment: The denotations (Def. 2c) red and orange illustrate the case of over-
lapping paronymy; whilst certain hues belong only to the set of the semantic 
forms (Def. 23b1) of allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of red and certain 
other hues only to the set of the semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of the allodeles 
(second sense) (Def. 23c2) of orange, there are also certain intermediate hues 
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that belong to an overlapping area (adapted from Mulder and Hervey 1980: 
209). 
Def. F7c1a. ‘Antonym’ for ‘member of a set of paronyms (Def. 7c) containing only two 
terms’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 208, Def. 7c1a). 
Comment: The bipolar semantic contrast displayed by antonyms is the result of 
the fact that all the members of the sets of the semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of the 
allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) belonging to a certain “field” – i.e. the set 
of the semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of the allodeles (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of 
their common hyperonym (Def. F7a1) – are members of either one or the other, 
or possibly both, of the sets of the semantic forms (Def. 23b1) of the allodeles 
(second sense) (Def. 23c2) of the antonyms in question (adapted from Mulder 
and Hervey 1980: 209). 
Def. F7c2a. ‘Exclusive antonyms’ for ‘antonyms (Def. 7c2a) whose allodeles (second 
sense) (Def. 23c2) have non-intersecting sets of semantic forms (Def. 
23b1)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 210, Def. 7c2a). 
Comment: The denotations (Def. 2c) dog and cat would appear to be exclusive 
antonyms with regard to their common hyperonym (Def. F7a1) animal (cf. 
Mulder and Hervey 1980: 210). Compare, however, the arguments presented 
regarding the semantic relationship between cat and animal in Cruse (1986: 
141), and discussed in Dickins (1998: 225–226). 
Def. F7c2b. ‘Overlapping antonyms’ for ‘antonyms (Def. F7c1a) whose allodeles (sec-
ond sense) (Def. 23c2) have overlapping sets of semantic forms (Def. 
23b1)’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 210, Def. 7c2b).  
Def. F7c1b. ‘Paronymy series’ for ‘paronymy set (Def. F7c1) with three or more mem-
bers’ (cf. Mulder and Hervey 1980: 211, Def. 7c1b). 
Comment: “Sets of colour terms in various languages give a paradigm example 
of paronymy series” (Mulder and Hervey 1980: 211). 
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